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ABSTRACT
This thesis discusses the philosophy of positivism in nineteenth century France. Based on
an empirical vision of society, positivism advocated values of rationality, progress, and
secularization. In that way, it stood as one of the defining systems of thought of the modern era. I
discuss, however, an undercurrent of anxiety about those same values. Positivism's founder,
Auguste Comte, argued that all sciences would become unified and organized under universal
principles and empirical standards. He viewed the human mind as becoming more rationalized
throughout history. In his later career, however, he argued that rationalism was a destructive
force and that a new form of secular religion as necessary to establish morality and order. I argue
that this transition from science to religion represents an underlying anxiety of the nineteenth
century. Intellectuals from different sides of the political spectrum viewed progress as positive,
but also limited. They argued that something beyond science, in the realm of the religious, the
metaphysical, or the subjective, was necessary for society. They expressed these concerns
through the language of gender. Comte argued that women would be at the center of his religion.
They would socialize and moralize men, making them part of a new unified, pacifist and orderly
social whole.
I also discuss two later intellectuals, social psychologist Gustave Le Bon and pioneering
sociologist Émile Durkheim. Le Bon represented the fin-de-siècle rejection of positivism. He
began with positivist principles, but later argued that humanity was irrational and violent. He
viewed the modern masses as a powerful force which threatened to destroy civilization. The
other figure, Durkheim, rejected Le Bon's form of nationalist right-wing thought and formed
ii

theories of social harmony, altruism, and a solidarity. He sought to reconcile egalitarian
republican principles with positivist science. Despite their diverging theories, however, Le Bon
and Durkheim employed similar assumptions about modernity and gender. Le Bon argued that
European men were superior, and that all other groups shared an undeveloped mentality.
Durkheim argued that men were social while women were simpler and mentally limited.
Their views, far from establishing an unproblematic hierarchy of gender and race, in fact
expressed anxieties about the state of modernity. They identified women, the lower classes, and
other societies with values of simplicity, unity, and tradition. They identified the modern,
Western male individual with the problems of modern society: excessive rationalization,
instability, and secularization. This sense of ambivalence about modernity reveals the central
importance of positivism to understanding nineteenth century thought. Positivism sought to
reconcile seemingly antithetical principles of order with progress, individualism with social
unity, and morality with rationalization. In doing so, it established anxieties about the forces of
change. Positivists advocated the most modern of principles, and sought to further the progress
of civilization, but also identified those rationalized forces as problems in need of control.
Positivism thus established its own undoing, which would come at the beginning of the twentieth
century. In that era, intellectuals rejected purely scientific visions of the world in favor of
subjective thought. I locate the origins of that rejection at the very foundations of positivist
theory.
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INTRODUCTION

In the 1830s, French philosopher Auguste Comte (1789-1847) established one of the
major philosophies of the century, positivism. He argued that all sciences were developing along
the same lines, from a theological, to a metaphysical, and finally a positive stage. In their final
form, they would adopt an empirical standard. The only true knowledge would be based on
observation and the formulation of general laws. At this point, all disciplines had reached this
final state, except for the social sciences. Comte argued that once positivism became complete, it
would reconcile the divergent intellectual trends of the modern era, ending “the current
intellectual disorder” 1 and “the state of crisis in which the most civilized nations have found
themselves for so long.” 2 I discuss how Comte and two later scientists, social psychologist
Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931) and sociologist Émile Durkheim, (1858-1917) used this idea of
objective science to found theories of social order based on their ideas of social, racial, and
sexual inequality. I also discuss another aspect of positivism. In his late career, Comte founded a
secular religion, based on veneration of humanity. He argued that the modern era was overlyrationalized, and that his system would revive the role of the emotions.
Why did he adopt this anti-rationalist idea? Comte himself argued that his love for a
woman named Clotilde de Vaux gave him a new understanding of the role of the emotions in
human life. 3 I argue, in addition, that it represented continuing anxieties over the power of

1

Auguste Comte, Cours de philosophie positive (Paris: Bachelier, 1830), 1:49-50.
Ibid., 1:1-50. For the quote, see ibid., 47-8.
3
Comte, Système de politique positive: ou, Traité de sociologie, instituant la religion de l'humanité (Paris: L.
Mathias, 1851), 8-11.
2
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rationalization. I frame this in the continuing legacy of the Enlightenment, and its debates on
science, individualism, and equality. As Sudhir Hazareesingh has written, positivism “harked
back to the Enlightenment's project of establishing a social and political order based on
progress.” 4 Positivism posited an objective understanding of human life and a secularized,
scientific social order. Yet its belief in science was not absolute. Comte himself founded his
social theory upon the two major strands of eighteenth century thought, both Enlightenment
scientism and Romantic subjectivism. Though positivism came to represent a scientific,
deterministic vision of the world, its practitioners in fact struggled with reconciling the
fundamental forces of the modern era, order with progress, the individual with the collective, and
rationality with ideals. Most importantly, positivists struggled with the role of science in society.
In Comte's religious work, he argued that reason was essentially destructive, and that the
“heart” was the true guide of human nature. The point of positivism, far from perfecting
rationality, was to establish “the ascendancy of the heart over the mind.” 5 Interpretations of this
shift have varied. Comte's early followers viewed his religion as a departure from the true,
scientific positivism. 6 Later work has viewed Comte's scientific and religious ideas as part of the
same project. 7 I follow this latter interpretation, but place it in a different context; I too argue that
positivism involved both science and religion, but view their coexistence as a sign of the
continuing anxiety over the ideas of the Enlightenment. Throughout his work, from his early
4

Sudhir Hazareesingh, Intellectual Founders of the Republic: Five Studies in Nineteenth-Century French
Republican Political Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 79.
5
Comte, Système, 1:4-5.
6
Walter M. Simon, European Positivism in the Nineteenth-Century: An Essay in Intellectual History (Repr., Port
Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1972), 19-24. John Stuart Mill viewed Comte's religion as an inferior deviation
from his earlier work. John Stuart Mill, Auguste Comte and Positivism (Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1961), 125-200.
7
Andrew Wernick, Auguste Comte and the Religion of Humanity: The Post-Theistic Program of French Social
Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 24; Mary Pickering, Auguste Comte: An Intellectual
Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 3:582-4.
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writings, he demonstrated an uncertainty over the nature of the social order, arguing that both
rationality and morality were necessary.
I argue, in addition, that Comte expressed this anxiety in the language of gender. When he
valorized rationality, he viewed men as superior and women as inferior, undeveloped and
childlike. When he rejected rationality for subjective thought he valorized women as a superior,
moral “guardian angels.” 8 The tension over rationality continued throughout the history
positivism. I discuss two other figures, Le Bon and sociologist Durkheim, who adopted parts of
Comte's theory. They began as empiricists, but demonstrated the same uncertainty over science.
Le Bon used positivism to reinforce an idea of social inequality, in which the European man was
the superior, intellectual leader of the world, but he viewed that reason as destructive, ruining
society's solidarity. In his popular writing on crowd psychology, he rejected rationalism
altogether, arguing that the man in the crowd reverted to a primitive, uncivilized state. Durkheim
was the leading sociologist of his time, the first to establish the discipline as an academic
science. He initially followed positivism and used empirical science to study the crisis of
modernization. He viewed this crisis, again, in terms of gender; he viewed the modern man as
losing his place in society, amidst the changes of modernization, while women remained in a
serene state of tradition, outside of the social world.
These intellectuals all undermined the idea of reason, identifying men with superior
rationality, but also a decadent intellectualism, and women with inferiority, but also with an
innate morality or harmony. What did this recurring pattern of imagery mean? Did it reflect

8

Comte, Catéchisme positiviste ou sommaire exposition de la religion universelle en onze entretiens systématiques
entre une femme et une prètre de l'humanité (Paris: Carilian-Goery et Vor. Dalmont, 1852), 185.
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ambivalence over change and progress? Was it an attempt to reinforce women's inferiority by
identifying that inferiority with an idealized basis of society? Both were true. By identifying men
as rational, these intellectuals could establish men's right to dominance. Conversely, by
identifying women with tradition, they could form a critique of modernity, in which the feminine
and uncivilized represented all that was lost in modern society. Importantly, the feminine and
masculine were not opposed, but complementary principles; imagining modernity in gendered
terms allowed intellectuals to conceive of an orderly progress, with the male and female spheres
reconciling tradition with change.
How does this study contribute to the study of nineteenth century France? There are
several answers. First, I update the historiography of positivism itself. There have been several
studies of the philosophy, mostly from the mid-twentieth century. 9 I incorporate more recent
trends, such as gender, race, imperial, and social histories. In addition, there have been numerous
works on Comte and Durkheim, and several about Le Bon, from the perspective of sociological
theory. 10 I place these intellectuals in a different context, the development of positivism, and use
them to highlight the continuing concerns over the role of science in the nineteenth century. I
have selected them because they all began with a positivist, scientific conception of human
society before deciding that objectivity was insufficient; humanity needed a subjective, moral
ideal to exist in society. This demonstrates the continuity throughout the early modern and

9

Simon, European Positivism; D.G. Charlton, Positivist Thought in France during the Second Empire (London:
Oxford University Press, 1959); Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man, and Reason: A Study in Nineteenth-Century
Thought (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 63-70; Leszek Kolakowski, The Alienation of Reason: A
History of Positivist Thought, trans. Norbert Gutterman (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1986).
10
Mike Gane, Auguste Comte (London: Routledge, 2006); Anthony Giddens, Durkheim (Hassock, Sussex, The
Harvester Press, 1978); Stjepan G. Mestrovic, Emile Durkheim and the Reformation of Sociology (Totawa, NJ:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1988).
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modern periods, in the debates between the Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment, the
liberals and the Ultras in the Restoration, and challenges to positivism in the fin-de-siècle.
Throughout, the same ideas remained in contention: rationalism, universalism, equality and
progress.
This point leads to the final question: why positivism, specifically? What does this
philosophy reveal that others do not? If the ideas of these intellectuals—concerning gender, race,
and science—were ubiquitous in the nineteenth century, what makes positivism a uniquely
important means to understand the centuries thought? I argue that the answer is in Comte's stated
goal, “to reconcile order and progress.” 11 He sought to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable:
tradition and change, the individual and the collective, and rationality with morality. In that way,
positivism takes on a new importance, not as the peak of nineteenth century optimism and belief
in science, but an idea at the center of the century's anxieties about modernity. Comte and his
followers existed at the divide between the empirical and the subjective, at the forefront on the
development of the major ideas of the time, in debates on gender difference, imperialism, and
democratization. For that reason, I connect them to a longer history, spanning the period from the
eighteenth century to the post-World War I era. Their importance is also apparent in Comte's
other formulation of his phrase: “Love for principal, order for basis, and progress for goal.” 12
That additional phrase, “love,” reveals the underlying tension in the positivists' thought. These
intellectuals all came to the conclusion that science and progress, though positive, could not
suffice to create a social order. There had to be something else, subjective and perhaps irrational,

11
12

Comte, Appel aux conservateurs (Paris: Victor Dalmont, 1855), viii.
Comte, Système, 1:321.
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to guide human life. That the century’s thought as a whole reached the same conclusions, leading
to the rejection of positivism, reveals the particular importance of positivism. It was an idea
which advanced the most modern of principles, yet undermined itself, creating the basis for its
own undoing.

Background: The Eighteenth Century

The most obvious way to examine the history of positivism would be to begin with its
intellectual predecessors. According to Leszek Kolakowski, positivism developed throughout the
early modern period, in the work of René Descartes, David Hume, Jean le Rond D’Alembert,
and others. 13 Walter Simon takes a more narrow approach, identifying positivism with the Comte
and his followers in the nineteenth century. 14 I have chosen a different framework for
understanding this history, centered not on positivism’s tenets, but on the debate over science and
rationality.
This clash came about in the early modern debates on the Enlightenment. The leaders of
that movement advocated a set of revolutionary ideas: equality, materialism, and a rationalist
reconstruction of society. 15 Initially, it formed a universal idea of human nature. According to
Descartes and subsequent philosophers, the human mind was universal. Society advanced, but

13

Kolakowski, The Alienation of Reason, 11-46.
Simon, European Positivism, 3-8.
15
Jonathan I. Israel, Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights 1750-1790 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011), 8-17.
14
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human nature remained essentially the same. 16 With the mid-eighteenth century, however,
philosopher Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot extended the idea of progress to include both the
individual and the social. He viewed humanity as essentially progressive. With the growth of
civilization, the human mind itself became superior. He viewed progress as developing in a
straight line, which would lead to the total civilization of the world. 17 He thus established two
key points; first, that humanity was universal but unequal. Because different societies advanced
at different rates, non-Western peoples represented the stages of the past. 18 Second, he
established the link between rationality and morality. His follower, Marquis de Condorcet,
advanced this idea further. He viewed history as a linear development, resulting in the
development of the human mind. 19 He viewed scientific and moral progress as one and the same;
in his utopian future, human nature would be perfected. The current evils of inequality and crime
would disappear and humanity would serve the ideal of scientific advancement. 20 There are
obvious problems inherent to these ideas. By arguing for universal equality, Enlightenment
philosophers in fact established the imperialist thinking of the following century. As Turgot
argued, Europeans represented the leaders of civilization, and thus had to spread their

16

An early interpretation, from J.B. Bury, argues that the Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns originated an idea of
cultural progress, but not human perfectibility. J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into its Origins and
Growth (London: MacMillan and Co., Limited, 1920), 98-112. Adam Smith viewed societies as developing through
stages, but rejected the idea of universal progress or intellectual advance. Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise
of Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005),
25-35.
17
Frank E. Manuel, The Prophets of Paris (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 22-36.
18
Robert Nisbet, “Turgot and the Contexts of Progress,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 119, no.
3 (June 1975), 217-18.
19
For Condorcet's idea of the stages of intellectual development, see Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat,
marquis de Condorcet, Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain. 2nd. e (Paris: Agasse, 1895),
1-15.
20
Manuel, Prophets of Paris, 96-100.
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enlightenment to the rest of the world. 21
Critics contested these universalist ideals throughout the century. In the early eighteenth
century, Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico rejected Descartes's idea of universal truth, instead
arguing for knowledge as subjective, and cultural ideas as fluid and changing. He argued that
cultures changed over time, passing through stages, and had to be understood on their own terms.
He argued that history was not linear, but cyclical; over time, a people rose up out of a primitive
state, became civilized, and then declined. The final stage was a return to the primitive state. 22
This theory continued in the nineteenth century, in the work of Le Bon, among others. 23 Another
eighteenth-century intellectual, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, rejected Enlightenment optimism for a
subjective, anti-rationalist philosophy. 24 He argued that the civilizing process, far from perfecting
humanity, instead increased its inherent flaws: greed, selfishness, and desire for power. 25 Western
society was degraded beyond hope. 26 In contrast to Condorcet's belief in a future utopia, he
valorized the beginnings of society, in its primitive state, as the most perfect form of human
life. 27 He argued that, in the modern period, strong nationalist belief was necessary. Most
philosophers viewed humanity as inherently social, and solidarity as spontaneous. Rousseau, in
contrast, argued that the government had to impose moral standards, and love of the country, to

21

Ibid., 41-2.
Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, ed. Henry Hardy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2000), 21-88.
23
H. Stuart Hughes discusses the resurgence of cyclical historical theory in the late nineteenth century. H. Stuart
Hughes, Oswald Spengler: A Critical Estimate (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), 36-50.
24
Berlin, Critics, 93-100.
25
Graeme Garrard, Rousseau's Counter-Enlightenment: A Republican Critique of the Philosophes (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2003), 41-53.
26
Ibid., 106-11.
27
Arthur O. Lovejoy, “The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality.” Modern Philology 21, no.
2 (November 1923), 179-81.
22
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form individuals into a society. 28
The reaction against the Enlightenment increased in the latter half of the century. The
French counter-Enlightenment viewed intellectual debates as a contest for the fate of society
itself. They believed that religion was the foundation for royal power and moral order and that
the atheism of the Enlightenment threatened to undermine that order. 29 In Germany, Johann
Gottfried von Herder argued that each society represented its own ideas and values, and that all
norms were equally valid. 30 By the time of the French Revolution, these debates established a set
of ideological oppositions, between the universal and the particular, stability and progress, and
most importantly, traditional belief and enlightenment. Comte, despite his belief in progress, in
fact adopted the counter-Enlightenment's characterization of the philosophers. He viewed their
revolutionary thought as essentially destructive. 31 He adopted the mission of replacing their
abstract ideas with concrete observation, and turning revolutionary ideas into the basis for order.
The French Revolution could only add to fears of the destructive power of rationality. The
revolutionaries believed that they could recreate the individual and the social at once, forming
society into a new, egalitarian unity. 32 They created the idea of a total break, in which the future
society would have no precedent. 33 This idea of discontinuity haunted the following century's
thought. As early as 1789, British philosopher Edmund Burke saw the Revolution as threatening
to unravel society's fabric; revolutionaries rejected tradition and reality in favor of abstract,
28

Garrard, Rousseau's Counter-Enlightenment, 55-68.
Darrin McMahon, Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of
Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 28-42.
30
Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism, ed. Henry Hardy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 57-67.
31
Comte, Cours, 35-61.
32
Mona Ozouf, “La Révolution française et l'idée de l'homme nouveau,” in The French Revolution and the Creation
of Modern Political Culture, ed. Colin Lucas (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988), 2:213-19.
33
Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004),
25-51.
29
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rationalist ideas. This was harmful. Destroying the current order would destroy all forms of
civility, demoralizing the population and releasing their inherent violence. 34 Burke thus
prefigured some of the fears of the following century; that civilization was superficial, and that
excess rationalization would undermine society's delicate order. After the violence of the Terror,
scientists rejected radical change and Enlightenment thought. 35 They redefined human nature,
not as universal and perfectible, but as limited and unequal. 36 They viewed the family as
providing a new stability to balance and control the individual’s life. 37
After the end of Napoleon's government in 1814, both the liberal and conservative
factions sought to restore a sense of coherence to history; the liberals, by integrating the
Revolution into an idea of historical progress, 38 and the monarchy and far-right Ultras, by
erasing the Revolution and adopting an idealized vision of the Old Regime. 39 This development,
as Darrin McMahon argues, represented a continuation of the previous century's debates on
Enlightenment. 40 The conservatives, like their predecessors, argued for particularism, tradition,
and continuity. They valorized the past and cultural identity. They argued that change had to be
gradual, rather than rapid, and had to follow a natural order. 41 By Comte's era, the ideas of the

34
Frank M. Turner, “Introduction,” in Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2003), xi-xxxvii.
35
Sean M. Quinlan, “Physical and Moral Regeneration after the Terror: Medical Culture, Sensibility and Family
Politics in France, 1794-1804.” Social History 29, no. 2 (May 2004), 139-147.
36
Manuel, “From Equality to Organicism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 17, no. 1 (January 1956), 58-62.
37
Quinlan, “Physical and Moral Regeneration,” 146-151.
38
Stanley Mellon, The Political Uses of History: A Study of Historians in the French Restoration (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1958), 16-18.
39
François Furet, Revolutionary France 1770-1880, trans. Antonia Nevill (Repr. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 294-8;
Sheryl Kroen, Politics and Theater: The Crisis of Legitimacy in Restoration France, 1815-1830 (University of
California Press, 2000), 39-62.
40
McMahon, Enemies of the Enlightenment, 154-7.
41
René Rémond, The Right Wing in France from 1815 to De Gaulle (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1969), 44-55.
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Enlightenment and Revolution continued to shape perceptions of history. There were two ideas;
one, a rationalist, revolutionary idea of change, and the other, a Romantic idea of continuity and
organic development. Comte is significant, for this thesis, because he attempted to synthesize
these two ideals, to historicize progress and created an empirical, rather than abstract idea of
revolution.

Modernity and the Femme au Foyer

A key idea stands out in these debates: the uncertain role of the individual in modern
society. Some took an optimistic view, arguing that progress would liberate human nature,
freeing the person from the corruption of the old order. Others were more cautious; they viewed
tradition as the basis for morality, and change as destabilizing the individual’s nature. In all of
these ideas, however, the individual was male. Two developments contributed to this idea. First,
as Thomas Laqueur and others have argued, the eighteenth century saw the development of a
new idea of sexual difference. In the pre-modern era, intellectuals and doctors had viewed the
sexes as physically similar, and all forms of biology as analogous. New medical thought
identified women and men as totally incommensurable. Every aspect of their bodies was totally
different. 42 Parallel to this, debates on women’s abilities also took a new turn. In the early
modern Querrel des femmes, early feminists argued for women’s abilities, and their opponents
42

Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1990), 4-21, 149-50; Londa Shiebinger, The Mind has no Sex?: Women in the origins of Modern Science
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 191-206.
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argued for their limits. 43 By the eighteenth century, both sides adopted the idea of women’s
difference and moral superiority. 44 This was the ideology of gender complementarity, which
continued into the coming century and beyond. 45
Lieselotte Steinbrügge argues that the feminine ideal emerged as a response to
modernization; in the face of social change, rationalization, and revolution, the idea of femininity
represented tradition, morality, and emotion. 46 This is apparent in Rousseau’s theory. He argued
that modernity corrupted men, but that women could resolve it. He argued that the ideal,
domestic woman would moralize men, influence them emotionally, and integrate them into
society. 47 Women represented an ideal of the natural, outside of society. This could serve as a
critique of the modern, but I argue that it also represented a way to conceive of the social order.
The revolutionaries of 1789 sought to reform society through marriage, establishing equality
between the sexes. 48 The following regimes, the Directory and Empire, limited this liberal ideal
and sought a return to patriarchy. 49 They too revealed an anxiety of masculine nature; the postThermidor regime, viewing the male individual as a problem in need of control, identified the

43

Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks, Women and Gender in Early Modern Europe, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), 24-7.
44
Steinbrügge discusses the shift in feminist debate. Lieselotte Steinbrügge, The Moral Sex: Woman's Nature in the
French Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 10-20. For the idea of feminine superiority, see
Marlene LeGates, “The Cult of Womanhood in Eighteenth-Century Thought,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 10, no. 1
(Autumn 1976), 21-39.
45
Camille Robcis discusses the structuralist idea of the family as the foundation of society. This idea played a part in
the debate on civil unions in the 1990s. Camille Robcis, The Law of Kinship: Anthropology, Psychoanalysis, and the
Family in France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 239-61.
46
Steinbrügge, The Moral Sex, 105-7.
47
Nicole Fermon, “Domesticating Women, Civilizing Men: Rousseau's Political Program,” The Sociological
Quarterly 35, no. 3 (August 1994), 431-42.
48
Suzanne Desan, The Family on Trial in Revolutionary France (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004),
47-92.
49
Ibid., 249-305.
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family as the way to moralize him. 50 This ideal of moral femininity became dominant in the
following century. It viewed women as at once greater and lesser than men; they were weaker in
every way, but this weakness was the source of their superiority. Thus, the physicians of the
Napoleonic era argued that women were entirely reproductive, ruled by biology. This function
weakened them and limited them to the home. 51 It also established their value; intellectuals of all
sorts, from feminists to antifeminists, positivists to Romantics, from the left to the right, viewed
women's domestic role as the key to society. 52 This meant that women were judged by a single
standard, whether or not they lived up to that function. Thus, two images emerged; the good
woman, who moralized society, and the bad woman, who corrupted it. 53
In the nineteenth-century ideology of gender complementarity, women were weak and
inferior, but also altruistic and morally superior. The union of the two natures, the masculine and
feminine, founded society and its moral basis. 54 This idea of complementarity was a way to
envision order amidst change. Indeed, the nineteenth century brought numerous transformations,
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in society, culture, politics, and thought. Historians such as Mary Louise Roberts have
demonstrated how gender, and specifically the woman, stood for ideas about changes throughout
society. 55 This is apparent in the three subjects of this thesis. Comte described women as
naturally selfless. 56 Le Bon referred to their “charming weakness.” 57 Durkheim viewed their
mental simplicity as a virtue. All three sought to discredit feminism; they argued for women’s
natural inferiority, as well as their normal place in the home.
Their views also represented a vision of stability. The family linked opposite principles of
change and tradition, weakness and strength, superiority and inferiority. For Comte, the
paternalistic relationship between the sexes founded “chivalry” 58 as the basis of society. Gender
complementarity thus represented an ideal, not just of hierarchy, but of unity. It defined the
normal order of things, also serving as a criticism of the imperfect state of modern society.
Importantly, this involved men as well as women. The femme au foyer defined the perfect,
selfless and moral women. I argue that it also served as a criticism of men and modernity as a
whole. By viewing women as moral and tradition, these intellectuals identified men with the
qualities of modernity: rationalization, secularization, and social instability. They viewed these
qualities as necessary, but also problematic.
Gender thus served as a useful tool for understanding modernity because it united both
principles, of tradition and change in a complex way. It made one sex superior, but viewed both
55
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with ideals necessary for society’s coherence. On this topic, I draw upon work that has analyzed
gendered representations of modernity and tradition, and in particular the historiography of
gender in the fin-de-siècle. 59 I contribute in several ways. First, I discuss how ideas of both
masculinity and femininity formed a coherent representation of modern society. Second, I
discuss how these representations demonstrated anxieties over progress, rationalization, and
bourgeois society. Third, I place the anxieties over the male individual in modern society, in a
longer framework. I argue that throughout modern history, from the Enlightenment to World War
I, intellectuals used the idea of the masculine individual to understand the destructive and
dehumanizing effects of modernization. Finally, I argue that gender and race, as well as gender,
were part of this critique. For Comte, Africans were “the loving race” 60 and the lower class had
“a superior morality.” 61 Both represented a counterpoint to the decadence of bourgeois
modernity.

Positivism and the Problem of Modernity

The first chapter is about the founder of positivism, Comte. In his early work of the 1820s
and 1830s, he viewed all of history in intellectual terms. He argued that the metaphysical school,
59
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which he identified with the Enlightenment, had destroyed the thought of the theological era, but
had failed to found a new system; thus, a form of “mental anarchy” 62 reigned. The solution,
according to Comte, was positivism; it would replace abstract theories with empirical
observation, allowing a truly objective form of government. Scientists would take over the
control of society and all political divisions and disagreements would fade, replaced by a
rationalist consensus. There was more to his theory. As Mary Pickering has argued, Comte's
system was “spiritual” from the beginning. 63 This is apparent in his view of gender. He identified
women with morality and men with rationality. Initially, he viewed the latter principle as
superior, but he later argued that emotion was more important to human nature. He founded a
religious system in the 1840s and 1850s, based on the ideals of morality, subjectivity, and
emotionalism. He idealized women as the true representatives of human nature, embodying
altruism and caring, the principles which he sought to establish in society. I argue that Comte
represented an iteration of the debate on rationalization. He viewed science as the basis for
society, but then rejected it, turning to a nostalgic idea of a feminine, traditional past.
Was this concern over rationalism limited to Comte? On the contrary, I argue that it
shaped the development of positivism for the rest of the century. After his death in 1857, the
organized positivist movement split into two; one group, following Émile Littré, rejected
Comte's religion and promoted his earlier, scientific thought. Another group, under Pierre Lafitte
in France and Richard Congreve in England, accepted his later religious work. 64 This split
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remained for the rest of positivism's history. Within each group, questions on positivism's nature
remained alive. Should positivism be purely scientific? Should it be a religion? Within the
religious school, there were debates on whether it should be an organized religion, or simply a
set of principles. 65 On the scientific side, Littré rejected Comte’s religion, but accepted his moral
ideas. 66 This debate on religion reflected a larger concern which became prominent in the
coming decades.
Littré played a key role in the positivist republicanism of the generation that founded the
Third Republic in 1870. This generation abandoned the revolutionary thought of their
predecessors and turned to ideals of gradual progress, secularization, and social stability. 67 By
the last decades of the century however, positivism had come to represent all of the worst aspects
of scientism. 68 Some philosophical trends argued for more subjective, intuitive ideas of
knowledge. 69 Others argued that science was limited and religion was necessary for society. 70
Finally, these trends took on a political meaning in the political clash of the Dreyfus Affair.
(1894-1906) The pro-Dreyfus left adopted universal values and positivism, while the right
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adopted anti-intellectualism and idealized visions of the nation. 71 In a broader perspective, this
division represented a familiar clash over the role of reason in society. It changed over time,
taking on new meanings, but it represented the same concern over the loss of tradition and the
creation of a rationalized society. Notably, this was not a concern limited to the right; the left also
saw the dangers of scientism in the fin-de-siècle and adopted forms of Idealism and metaphysical
thought. 72
The two following chapters discuss a figure on one side of this political divide. The first
is Gustave Le Bon, the right-wing anthropologist and social psychologist. He began his career as
a positivist. He used a Social Darwinist conception of society to argue that struggle and
inequality were necessary for society. In his words, “to live is to struggle.” 73 Yet his work
highlights one of the underlying questions about the meaning of progress: did scientific progress
create morality or destroy it? According to Le Bon, progress was in fact double; scientific and
technological advance rapidly transformed society, but human nature itself, and its sense of
morality lagged behind. This was a problem, because while science destroyed religious
conceptions of the world, no new ideas arrived to replace them. Western civilization was in a
state of transition, losing its unifying beliefs and solidarity.
The symbol of this decadence was the modern crowd. Le Bon argue that the masses were
taking over society, “act[ing] like the microbes which decompose debilitated bodies or
71
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cadavers.” 74 He described their threat in gendered and racialized terms. Crowds were
impressionable and mercurial, like women and primitives, and exposed the innate irrationality of
human nature. Unconscious forces, and not rationalist decisions, drove history. He viewed this
unconscious as a negative force; it was responsible for the disasters of the modern era, in the
form of revolution. Yet it also represented the solution to the decadence of the West. Le Bon
argued that France had to adopt irrational ideas in order to revive itself. It had to defend the
nation. In this way, Le Bon is an example of the development of the nationalist right in the
1890s.
The final chapter is about sociologist Emile Durkheim. In contrast to Le Bon, Durkheim
was politically on the left and supported the Third Republic government. He adopted positivist
thought, but viewed it as problematic; by the 1880s, positivism had taken elitist and authoritarian
forms. For that reason, Durkheim updated positivism to reconcile it with the values of the
republic. He rejected Le Bon’s Social Darwinist vision of social development and argued that
society existed outside of the realm of nature. The individual was essentially social and race was
irrelevant. Like Le Bon, however, he shared the fin-de-siècle idea of social decline. He argued
that excessive social change weakened solidarity and norms and led to rising unhappiness. Once
again, this idea of modernity was gender-specific; Durkheim argued that the ills of progress
effected men, while women remained outside of modern society, in a simpler state. He reiterated
the common idea of men as modern and social, and women as traditional and ahistorical. 75 Yet
this made men the problem. Durkheim, like Comte and Le Bon used the idea of the modern man
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to represent the loss of tradition in the modern world.
During the events of the Dreyfus Affair, Durkheim found a solution to the problem of
modernity: religion. Like others of his time, he viewed religion as the basis of morality, but
viewed it as inevitably declining in an era of rationalization. A purely scientific perspective was
inadequate. But he believed that a new, secular form of belief could replace religion. In his
lectures on education of the early twentieth century, he described a secular moralism, founded on
an idea of individualism. In contrast to earlier conceptions, he argued that this individualism
would be altruistic and social. He conceived of the person as a part of the collective, and belief in
the individual as a way of supporting social solidarity. In the same era, he began studies on the
societies of Australia and North America. He believed that, by studying the most primitive and
undeveloped form of culture and religion, one could understand the basis for modern society as
well. It would reveal the basis for society. In this work, Durkheim rejected contemporary ideas of
unilinear development and naturalistic understandings of social development. He argued that
each society followed its own development and that social norms were constructed and
contingent rather than inevitable. Yet this failed to change his conceptions of social norms; he
still defended ideas of racial and sexual hierarchy, but on social, rather than natural terms. He
argued that women had to remain in traditional roles because those roles were part of society’s
structure.
These chapters end in 1914, but the conclusion discusses Le Bon and Durkheim’s
responses to the war. Despite their differing theories, they became part of the wartime consensus,
viewing the war as ending the decadence of the Belle Époque. Here at last was the solution to the
problems of modernity. Of course, this perspective was short-lived; the effects of the war finally
20

separated the idea of scientific and moral progress. Science, rather than creating moral progress,
instead led to dehumanization and unprecedented destruction. 76 Positivist theory ended. Even so,
I suggest ways in which the ideas of the nineteenth century, on the family, gender, and the nation,
continued to influence twentieth and twenty-first century thought. Ultimately, I place positivism
in a larger framework; not just as an important idea of the nineteenth century, but one which took
part in debates that continued throughout the modern era, from the eighteenth-century to the
present.
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CHAPTER ONE
“TO FORM AND PERFECT MEN”: AUGUSTE COMTE AND THE
ORIGINS OF POSITIVISM

Auguste Comte has long posed a problem of interpretation. In his early career, he
argued that human knowledge was advancing toward an objective, empirical state, and that a
new science of society would reorganize and rationalize human life. He later rejected all of these
principles. He argued that reason was wholly destructive, and that subjective ideas of morality
and religion would provide the basis for a new society. How can one reconcile these widely
divergent theories? I argue that the key is to understand his critique of the Enlightenment. He
viewed modern history as a period of intellectual revolution in which the progressive forces of
science and philosophy wiped away the older, theological way of thought. Revolutionary thought
provided the basis for a new conception of society, but remained limited; it advanced false ideas
of liberty and equality, which created only destruction. Comte's goal, then, was to take up and
improve on the work of the eighteenth century.
The first section of this chapter argued that in the 1820s he adopted the liberal thought of
the eighteenth century, but transformed its egalitarianism into arguments for inequality. He
argued that progress improved human nature, but human nature was then unequal throughout the
world. The second section discusses his more anti-liberal thought of the 1830s. He argued that
women and men were complementary, but unequal, and that women had to remain under men's
power. In this way, Comte provides an example of ideological transformation, showing how
liberal turned to authoritarian thought. The following chapters demonstrate the same
22

transformation, as positivism became part of both far-right and republican thought.
The final section discusses the greatest shift in his thought, from empiricism to religious
thought. This last period, I argue, represented a new iteration of his criticism of reason. He
argued that the woman, rather than inferior, represented a new ideal for humanity, standing for
virtues of unity, morality, and tradition. Where he had once viewed reason as incomplete, he
came to argue that reason itself was the problem. The rational man was corrupt and the emotional
woman was the solution. I argue that all of his thought, from his early scientism to later religion,
was part of the same critique of modernity. His views on women exemplify this concern. As
Mary Pickering has demonstrated, Comte began as a feminist following the feminism of the
Enlightenment, before rejecting feminism for patriarchal thought, and then adopting the
feminism of the 1848 era. 77 I follow this interpretation, but argue that there were underlying
continuities as well. Throughout his career, Comte viewed women as symbols of tradition and
morality. They would save man by socializing and moralizing him.
As studies of women's history have demonstrated, such ideas could serve to subordinate
women. 78 Because these views identified the woman was perfect and the man corrupt, women
had to serve men by ameliorating their nature. I argue, in addition, that Comte's feminine ideal
was also a critique of modernity and masculinity. He identified women with the stability that was
lost in modern society. The true change in Comte's theory was in how he expressed his concern
about progress and rationalization. When he sought to create a scientific hierarchy, he viewed
77
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women as undeveloped inferiors, but when he turned to Romantic ideas of emotionalism, he
valorized women's altruism and criticized men's egoism. These ideas set the stage for the later
nineteenth century rejection of positivism. Comte thus represents the underlying tensions in
scientific thought. Even at the beginning of positivism's development, its founder viewed pure
empiricism as limited.

From Ideology to Knowledge: The Problem of Political Division after the Revolution

As Lynn Hunt argues, the French Revolution’s idea of remaking France destroyed the old
consensus on society, in which the monarchy was the only possible government. In its place, new
ideas for reforming society developed which created various political factions, socialism,
republicanism, and others. She states that “rather than expressing an ideology, therefore,
revolutionary politics brought ideology into being.” 79 This division grew in subsequent years,
creating new, contrary ideas of the French past. Liberals argued that the progress of liberty led
inevitably to the Revolution and the current government. They reversed the meaning of
revolution, from a break with the past, to a link in history, and from the destruction of monarchy
to the foundation of liberal monarchy. 80 Ultimately, they made revolution an orderly
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phenomenon.
In contrast, the conservatives rejected the idea of progress and viewed the Old Regime as
a stable, unchanging ideal. 81 They adopted the idea of the revolution as an ahistorical break. For
them, it had no basis in the past, had no popular support, and represented an Enlightenment
scheme against the monarchy. 82 Where the liberals integrated the revolution into the nation's
history, the conservatives tried the erase it. After Napoleon's Hundred Days, (March-July 1815)
the government attempted to suppress revolutionary and imperial signs and symbols, to make the
public forget the recent past. 83 As Sheryl Kroen argues, royalists wanted to erase the Revolution,
to return to a time when monarchy was the only possible government. 84 Together with the
liberals, they wanted to redefine politics, to make a divided society seem unified again.
Philosopher Henri Saint-Simon (1760-1825) provided another means to unity. He argued
that over time, a civilization grew and established itself, but came into conflict with the rise of
the next state of civilization. New intellectuals challenged the established social order, creating a
revolution. He identified the current era as one of these periods of disorder, which would resolve
itself in a period of “synthesis.” This process repeated over time, making history itself a process
of continual revolution, in which power was always uncertain and never fixed. Following
Condorcet's idea of teleological history, Saint-Simon believed that there was a solution to
revolution: scientific government. 85 In Saint-Simon's theory, the productive parts of society,
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workers and bourgeoisie, would institute a new kind of peaceful revolution, using science to
rationalize society. 86 They would reform the class system, basing it on nature rather than
tradition. 87 They would end political division, replacing dangerous ideology with exact science. 88
In this way, Saint-Simon hoped to resolve the problem of modernity, not by erasing revolution,
but by transforming all of history into a single dialectical revolution. For him, change created
disorder, conflicting ideas and systems, but these would come together into a unified whole.
History was not just fixed, but limited. It would end as science turned change into stability,
difference into unity, and ideas into knowledge.
Saint-Simon’s protégé, Auguste Comte, adopted this theory of history. In 1820, he wrote
an essay in which he explained the rise and fall of the Old Regime. According to Comte, this
order developed in the late medieval era, with the establishment of the religious and royal power.
At the same time, its opposition came into being: industry and positive science. These forces
coexisted at first, but conflict was inevitable. 89 Like Condorcet, Comte saw history as an
inevitable process, leading toward revolution. He argued that the modern era saw the progressive
forces challenge the established order, eventually undoing the Old Regime’s social order. 90
Following Saint-Simon, he took a more pessimistic view of the Revolution and its ideology. He
argued that liberal ideas of sovereignty were false and destructive. They served a useful purpose,

86

For his definition of industrials and their use of scientists, see Manuel, Saint-Simon, 256-60. For his idea of
science as a way to avoid revolution, see ibid., 272-7.
87
Ibid., 243-6.
88
Ibid., 275-7.
89
Comte, “Sommaire appréciation de l'ensemble du passé moderne,” in Système de politique positive: ou, traité de
sociologie, instituant la religion de l'humanité (Paris: L. Mathias, 1851), 4:4-10.
90
Ibid., 11-19.

26

ending the old order, but could not found a new one. 91 In this way, Comte continued the wellestablished discourse of order against progress, but took a new approach. Earlier liberals, such as
Turgot and Condorcet, imagined liberal values as inherently positive, resulting in a utopian
society. At the same time, they viewed the intellect as creating progress. It grew over time,
passing from a primitive to a scientific state. 92 In this way, liberalism appears empirical; it
reflected the growing understanding of human nature.
Comte, in contrast, used the idea of progressive empiricism to reject liberal as well as
conservative values, ultimately arguing for a political science that transcended politics. To do so,
he re-imagined human nature and society. Liberalism had imagined society as universal; the
same standards applied at all times. Comte, in contrast, argued that each period was unique, with
its own standards. 93 It developed over time, leading to superior forms. Human nature developed
in the same way. Like Condorcet, he viewed it as becoming superior over time, taking on a more
equal form. Yet, unlike earlier theorists, he viewed social nature and the natural state as the same,
rather than in conflict. Progress, rather than the gradual unveiling of natural equality, recreated
nature into a superior state. He argued that education and industrialization would improve human
nature, giving people the rationality and work ethic that they would need to be free. Without
those qualities, however, they had to remain under external control. This established several
things: that individuals are unequal, that human nature is malleable and progressive, and, most
importantly, that human beings were a historical, rather than universal, phenomena. This meant
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that, to govern society, one had to understand its overall development and current state. For that
reason, Comte proposed a new, rationalized form of government, in which the progressive
forces, scientists and industrialists, would take power. The scientists would create a political
science modeled on natural science, which would abolish ideas of representation and public
interest. In the new system, “the government of things replaces the government of people.” 94 The
industrialists would provide the material forces necessary to run society. 95 This system would
achieve the Enlightenment dream of scientific government, but stripped of the harmful forces of
ideology. In Comte’s view, royalism represented early, theological thought. Liberalism
represented the next stage, metaphysics. 96 Both were obsolete. Positivism would institute an
empirical form of politics, which would understand history as a scientific phenomenon,
following scientific laws, and moving along a fixed course. Political theory would give way to
scientific facts, and doctrine to theory. Ultimately, this meant that conflict and disagreement
would end, replaced by consensus and cooperation.
Even as Comte rejected the Enlightenment idea of human equality, he created another
one, based on his concept of progress. Since the late eighteenth century, scientists such as Pierre
Jean George Cabanis and Franz Joseph Gall had developed idea of inequality based on
physiology. 97 Saint-Simon viewed some races as innately inferior and unable to progress. 98
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Comte rejected this idea. He argued that biology was limited to the natural person in his
primitive state. The modern person transcended that existence, becoming largely social in
nature. 99 He thus viewed humanity as progressive; because social change ameliorated their
nature, and their nature corresponded to their social role, he viewed a change over time as a total
change in nature. Humanity, again, became more rational, tending toward a fixed end point of
superiority. This was not, however, truly universal. He believed that all people and all societies
had the same course of development, but that they existed in unequal states in the present
time. 100 He followed the idea, from Turgot, Condorcet, and Saint-Simon that different societies
represented different stages of development. 101 Unlike those earlier theorists, he made no
argument for Europe's need to spread its modernity to the less advanced. 102 He viewed change as
relative, with each stage as a coherent whole. No institution was inherently good or bad, unless it
outlived its usefulness. 103 Furthermore, the less advanced were not ready for modern norms, such
as modern rights. 104 Progress had to be gradual and natural, rather than abrupt. This rejection of
civilizing ideology would later serve to support ideas of imperial control. Here, however, his
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interest was fixed firmly in Europe. Other societies, for him, served to reflect the European past,
as verification of his universal theory of progress. 105
How did one identify progress? For earlier Enlightenment intellectuals, one key sign was
the status of women. They argued that women’s roles improved over time, and even contributed
to the furthering of morality in society. 106 Some, such as Mary Wollstonecraft, used the concept
of enlightenment to justify giving women equal education and rights. She argued that women
played a key role, as mothers and wives, and needed to become rational in order to instill virtue
and morality into their families. 107 Mary Pickering argued that Comte’s early work followed this
early form of feminism. 108 Comte argued that women in primitive society were subjugated and
lived as “beasts of burden.” The march of progress inevitably increased their status, but more
work was necessary. Currently, men kept them under a brutal regime, using violence to
dehumanize them. The result was that women were as oppressed as the lowest parts of society,
including slaves and serfs. Because, however, progress was inevitable, their state would improve.
Reflecting his larger pacifist, utopian vision, he argued that the current masculine culture, with
its culture of violence, would end, bringing about greater freedom for both women and men. 109
Pickering views this as his early feminist stage, prior to his turn to patriarchal thought in the
1820s. 110 He did become less favorable to women’s liberation, but I argue that it represented a

105

Ibid., 130.
For these ideas, see Sylvana Tomaselli, “The Enlightenment Debate on Women,” History Workshop no. 20
(August 1985), 106-21.
107
Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, ed. Deirdre Shauna Lynch, 3rd. ed. (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2009), 5-9.
108
She argues that Comte followed Enlightenment feminism, including the idea of women’s moral superiority.
Pickering, “Angels and Demons,” 11-12.
109
This comes from an 1819 letter. Comte, Lettres d'Auguste Comte à M. Valat. 1815-1844 (Paris: Dunod, 1870),
85-7.
110
Pickering, “Angels and Demons,” 10.
106

30

continuation of, rather than a contradiction with, his feminist belief. To understand why, one
must return to the feminism of the Enlightenment.
Feminists such as Condorcet, Olympe de Gouges, and Wollstonecraft argued that women
had the same mental abilities, reason, and perfectible nature as men, and should gain the
corresponding rights and duties. 111 But women were not currently equal; patriarchal society
ruined their nature, making them superficial, greedy, and treacherous. 112 Women’s inferiority
represented the decline of civilization, just as their progress represented the improvement of
society as a whole. They became the keys to modernity, both symbolizing and creating
civilization. It was this last point that introduced the problem; though Enlightenment feminism
blamed men for oppressing women, it linked women to the decline of society. In Wollstonecraft’s
argument, women’s ignorance was the one thing that could hold back enlightenment. 113 In de
Gouges's argument, women’s abject state caused “public misfortunes and the corruption of
governments.” 114 Wollstonecraft envisioned an alternative to this corrupt woman: a rational,
moralized, masculine woman, who could reform society as a whole. 115 Thus, one sees
Rousseau’s idea of complementarity inverted; where he used to argue for controlling and limiting
women, they argued for freeing women. They nevertheless laid the basis for a new patriarchy. By
contrasting ignorance with morality, these feminists prefigured the nineteenth century idea of the
good and bad woman. In addition, because women could restore society through the home,

111

For their arguments, see Wollstonecraft, Vindication, 9-13; Condorcet, “Droit de cité,” 121-2; Olympe de
Gouges, “The Rights of Woman,” in John R. Cole, Between the Queen and the Cabby: Olympe de Gouges’s Rights
of Woman (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2011), 30-4.
112
Wollstonecraft, Vindication, 9-13, 21-5; de Gouges, “Rights of Woman,” 34-7.
113
Wollstonecraft, Vindication, 5-9.
114
De Gouges, “Rights of Woman,” 31.
115
Wollstonecraft wanted to give women the rationality and virtue of men. Wollstonecraft, Vindication, 25-36.

31

nineteenth century thinkers argued that women had to be kept there, free from the corruption of
modernity. At the start of the 1820s, Comte still followed Wollstonecraft’s vision of liberation.
Later, however, he would use the same idea of women’s moralizing role to support women’s
subjugation.

The Cours de Philosophie Positive

The turning point came in 1825, when Comte married a woman named Caroline Massin.
She was working as a prostitute at the time, and by marrying her, he saw himself as a noble
protector, saving her from her abject lifestyle. 116 Soon, however, they came to a disagreement; he
believed that women should be meek and compliant, but she refused to submit. Faced with this
strong-minded women, he condemned her as immoral and treacherous. According to Pickering,
this represented the end of his feminist aspirations and his turn to patriarchal thought. 117 It seems
possible, however, that it may have simply revealed his feminism as abstract and theoretical,
without any real conviction. In his earlier career, he had defended the interests of what he saw as
the oppressed parts of society. 118 Massin, as a poor but intelligent woman, fit this vision of the
noble victim perfectly. Indeed, Pickering states that he “was attracted to the idea of rehabilitating
a fallen woman, which was one of the leading themes of the literature of the epoch.” 119 When
she resisted his ideas, however, she broke his fantasy; he was faced with an actual person, not an
116
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ideal who would follow his vision. He subsequently formulated a new image of women, not as
superior, but as irrational, childlike and undeveloped. Yet the romantic vision did not die.
Instead, he divided the female population into two; the treacherous, sexual woman, like Massin,
and the familiar archetype of the loving and submissive mother and wife. 120 He had particular
use for the latter in the era of the July Monarchy, which reinforced the theme of social crisis.
The July Monarchy highlighted the forces of division in modern society. Numerous
groups voiced their diverging visions for social reform. The Utopian Socialists argued for
reorganizing industry. 121 The early feminist movement formed and argued for improvements in
women's status. 122 Social economists studied the ills of urban life. 123The discourse of social
struggle grew, with this iteration placing the bourgeoisie against the workers. Each side
demonized the other; liberals saw the workers as a revolutionary force, and the labor movement
adopted this image, viewing themselves as the new liberals and the bourgeoisie as the new
unproductive nobility. 124 Just as these discourses began to develop, in 1830, Comte published his
Cours de philosophie positive, in which he outlined a way out of the current crisis using positive
science.
The problem, for Comte, was to reconcile the existence of division with his ideal of unity.
The answer was to employ two theories of history: one linear, the other dialectical. First, he
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argued that the human mind progressed over time. It began in a theological state, which
attributed causality to higher powers, then a metaphysical state, which turned to abstract
principles, and finally a positive state, which abandoned absolute causes in favor of empirical
observation. 125 In the last stage, the science of sociology would allow for the creation of
rationalized government under the guidance of scientific experts. Unfortunately, the current era
saw the stages in conflict. Various doctrines, the royalists, republicans, and liberals were at odds,
and this created the impression of crisis. As Comte, wrote, “The current disorder of ideas is due,
in the final analysis, to the employment of these three radically incompatible philosophies.” 126
The solution was a new dialectical theory. In it, he argued that the two contrary forces,
theological order and metaphysical progress, would come together under a positivist synthesis. 127
Thus, he adopted the progressive theories of the eighteenth century, but in a more conservative
form. History, rather than leading toward endless improvement and infinite change, led from
thesis to synthesis, and toward a defined end. In an era of continuing social and political conflict,
his theory promised a way to understand and finally end the state of revolution.
In his system, there were in fact two sets of forces: not just “order and progress,” but
order and disorder. In the former, Comte would bring together and unify the dangerously
divergent politics of the modern era. It the latter, implicit within this, he would replace modern
politics altogether. Disorder meant not just dysfunction but disagreement itself. They became, in
fact, practically synonymous. Because he identified political ideologies with different stages of
intellectual development, and the coexistence of different stages as a fundamentally disordered
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mind, he was able to cast disagreement as chaos, and unity as the creation of absolute consensus
and the end of political conflict. In this system, the only possible end was scientific government.
He took the liberal idea of history, which meant progress as increasing liberty and equality, and
used it to reject liberal values altogether. In contrast to Condorcet, who imagined future progress
as the development of the Revolution, 128 Comte viewed revolution as simply a means to a new,
scientific hierarchy and authority. Where Condorcet imagined intellectual progress as the
development of egalitarianism, the idea of universal human nature, 129 and the improvement of
the popular mind, 130 Comte identified it as reinforcing his idea of hierarchy. The key difference
was their concept of the social; for Condorcet, the liberal, the social was inevitably based on the
individual, but for Comte, the authoritarian intellectual, the single person had no place. If the
human race improved, it need not include all of its member. He viewed women as outside of the
social realm, and thus incapable of progress.
Comte rejected his earlier ideas of women's liberation, instead arguing that women's
minds remained fixed in an inferior state. 131 Because of that, they could not run businesses, take
leadership roles, or hold any kind of power, even in the home. 132 Furthermore, this was a
historical inevitability which could never change. For evidence, he used the animal kingdom, in
which the female was always inferior. 133 He used human history, in which women were always
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under men's power. 134 Where other oppressed groups, such as feudal serfs, had become free,
women still remained under patriarchal authority. For that reason, he argued that women’s social
inferiority corresponded to natural inferiority, and that they had to remain in the home. 135 He
separated women from his general idea of historical change. In general, he believed that
institutions and beliefs changed as time passed, but for women he used precedent to justify the
continuance of existing practices.
Comte’s theory figured women as an outsider in society, separate from the rest of the
human race. Where humanity was social, women were biological. 136 Where humanity improved
over time, becoming more rational, women remained the same or regressed. 137 They were
outside of his idea of history and outside of his vision of human development altogether. He
argued that women were not just inferior, but in some way inhuman. Equality was impossible
because “the feminine sex” existed “in a state of continual childhood, which further removes it,
under the most important regards, from the ideal type of the race.” 138 In this way, he used one of
the principles of recapitulation theory: that everyone developed along a single line of
improvement, but that only some, in this case men, reached the end point. 139 That end point, in
effect, became the standard upon which all were compared, the “great human type.” 140 Vincent

134

Comte, Cours, 3:568-70.
Comte, “October 5, 1843,” 188-9.
136
Vincent Guillin argues that Comte's idea of women's inferiority as biological contradicted his larger sociological
methodology. Vincent Guillin, Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill on Sexual Equality: Historical, Methodological
and Philosophical Issues (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 19-22.
137
Pickering, Auguste Comte, 1:627.
138
Comte, Cours, 4:570.
139
For discussions of this theory in the later nineteenth century, see Russett, Sexual Science, 50-6; Stephen Jay
Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1981), 113-19.
140
Comte, “October 5, 1843,” 184-5.
135

36

Guillin views Comte's idea of women as contradicting his general theory. 141 Comte cast women
as a separate category, outside of social change. As Comte's misogynist rhetoric indicates,
however, this exclusion was entirely intentional, and in fact represents a continuing theme in
sociological theory: the assumption that men were social and women natural. 142
It was also a key component of his larger social theory. He argued, reflecting his rejection
of liberalism, that the family, and not the individual, formed the smallest unit of society. He
viewed this as the site of socialization. The family brought together the genders in a
complementary union, moralizing and socializing the individual. 143 This theory represented the
transformation of feminism into patriarchalism. Comte continued Wollstonecraft’s idea of
women as a civilizing force, but used it to argue for their continued subjugation. In his view,
women were greater in emotion and morality, but incapable of intellectual progress, and were
naturally suited to a purely domestic existence. 144 Comte thus represents the universality of the
ideology of gender complementarity, which supported wildly varying agendas, from feminism to
antifeminism. 145 In Comte’s work, complementarity established, not just the basis for gender
relations, but the development of society itself. To resolve the crisis of modernity, he had to
create a structure of order which would still allow for both individual and social progress. By
making the family the basis for society, however, he introduced a problem: it had to resist
modern change, but as a social institution, it had to be progressive. He resolved that contradiction
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with his theory of complementarity. He argued that the family, though it changed throughout
history, always rested on a timeless foundation of gender inequality. 146
Carole Pateman argues the liberal theory of social contract created an idea of the
individual as universal and equal, while relegating women to a subordinate position. 147 Comte
continued the same theme, but translated to an illiberal form. Unlike liberal and feminist thought,
in which the category of universal human nature often hid a masculine bias, Comte’s theory
brought human difference to the fore. For humanity to be progressive but women traditional, and
the family progressive yet fixed, he had to separate women from his social theory. They had a
different nature, based on the natural itself; as men progressed and became more public, women
would lag behind, becoming more firmly entrenched in the home. 148 With the sexes thus divided,
he identified progress as effectively masculine, and the idea of feminist progress as a
contradiction in terms. Where contemporary feminists saw women’s equality as a part of the
overall development of human civilization, Comte identified it as a primitive impulse, leading
toward an inferior state. He argued that in nature, only inferior organisms had gender equality.
As phenomena developed, sexual disparity grew. 149 Using these terms, he argued that feminism
was unnatural and doomed to failure. In his correspondence with the leading feminist of his day,
John Stuart Mill, Comte disparaged Mill’s feminism as a mere passing “phase,” representative of
the era’s general “mental anarchy.” 150 He suggested that, just as he had once believed in
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Wollstonecraft’s ideas, but had grown past it, Mill would as well. 151 In reality, Comte’s
misogyny was the true phase, a transitional stage toward his next vision of women’s civilizing
role.
Though he dismissed it as a passing phenomenon, Comte still viewed feminism as a real
threat to society. It would take women out of their domestic role, thus putting them in
competition against men. In that situation, they could not hope to succeed, and would reveal their
inferiority. 152 In this way, feminism would serve a useful purpose: it would highlight the need for
domesticity. It would also have harmful effects on society, by lessening women's feminine
nature, diminishing their “charm,” and thus weakening the attraction that men felt for them. 153
Here, Comte revealed the two bases for his support of domesticity: not just natural, but
utilitarian. He argued that women could not leave the home. The reason, he believed, was that
women were inferior and could not compete. To support this idea, however, he pointed to
history: women had never freed themselves, so they were inferior. His argument about nature
was in fact circular; he believed that women had to be domestic because they were inferior, and
that they were inferior because they were domestic. In contrast, the utilitarian argument—that
women had to stay in the home to support society—had a strong basis: the home was the
foundation of society, and change would threaten it. Yet, to base his ideas on utility would reveal
his system as biased and subjective, not based on objective observation of nature. To support the
idea of domesticity as natural, he had only one foundation: biology. In general, he viewed
biology as a limited factor in social study. He criticized earlier studies, centered on the single
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person, and argued for the importance of environment. 154 But when he supported women's
inferiority, he used natural science and analogies with other species. 155 This reveals his
ambivalent view of women's nature. He viewed them as a socializing, moralizing agent, but they
were also asocial. This was because, for Comte, women were essentially passive objects, meant
to inspire feelings, but possessing no subjectivity of their own.

The Religion of Humanity

Since the 1830s, industrialization and social change had opened debates on class and
gender in French society. First, social scientists studied the problem of the lower classes,
vilifying them and representing their lifestyles as unhealthy and dangerous. 156 At the same time,
the workers' movement challenged bourgeois values, identifying the workers as the key to
regenerating society. 157 Feminism caused similar divisions. In the 1840s, leading to the 1848
Revolution, feminism adopted a maternalist idea and based its claims on women's different
nature. 158 In response, a new wave of antifeminism attempted to reinforce women's
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subordination. In this work, from Michelet and Proudhon, women appear dangerous and
corrupting, and thus had to be limited to the home. 159 Thus, after the Revolution, there were two
contrary discourses on change: one that challenged existing hierarchies, and the other attempting
to reinforce them. Comte, because of his conservative and antifeminist views, could have
followed the second discourse. Instead, his 1850s work adopted the ideology of the workers and
women's movements. To understand why, it is necessary to review his career in the 1840s, prior
to the revolution.
There were two basic reasons for the shift in his thought. The first is related to his career,
and the second to his personal relationships. In the early 1840s, he held a position as teacher at
the Ecole Polytechnique. 160 Due to his critical stance against the faculty and administration, he
soon faced hostility and eventually lost his job. 161 In this context, he rejected the role of scientists
and elite education in modern society. He viewed this education as overly esoteric and
intellectually harmful, 162 and that the privileged classes were too conservative to follow
positivism.163 The popular classes, in contrast, were the ideal subject for education. 164 They were
simpler, with “common sense” 165 and practical social interests. 166 Moreover, they were outside of
the distracting influences of society 167 and represented a “clean slate.” 168 For that reason, he
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created a new, more egalitarian form of positivism. It was egalitarian for two reasons: first,
because it would be open to the wider public, 169 and second, because it was based on “universal
common sense” 170 and a subjective approach. 171 Comte valorized the common people, not just as
morally, but also intellectually superior to elites. He argued that they would serve to ameliorate
the problems of modern science by expressing a general, educated critique of current studies. 172
They took a central place in his new theory of the 1840s, along with another group that he saw as
powerless: women.
The model for Comte's new gender ideology was another poor but educated woman,
Clotilde de Vaux. When he met her, she hardly fit his image of the femme au foyer. Though she
held some traditionalist beliefs, she was also living separated from her husband and was seeking
an independent career as a writer. 173 As Pickering has argued, his initial feelings had little to do
with Romantic ideals. “The story of Auguste Comte and Clotilde de Vaux is basically the tale of
a man trying to force a woman to accept his sexual advances and his desire to be the center of her
universe, while she makes every effort to resist him and create her own autonomous life.” 174
Subsequently, he found a way to interpret her lack of interest as a sign of feminine nobility, the
key to his salvation. According to Pickering, “He claimed that by her superior virtue, she had rid
him of his crude male sex drive and transformed him into the virtuous champion of humanity.” 175
He thus realized his dream of gender complementarity as the way to social regeneration; he was
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the corrupt man, in need of saving, and she was the idealized woman, existing to serve him.
If this repeated his earlier views, however, there was an innovation; where his earlier
positivism had attributed gender difference to nature, he came to view it as fluid and
constructed. 176 Echoing the revolutionary idea of reforming the family, he argued that marriage
brought together the two sides of humanity, with the wife giving men feminine traits and the
husband giving the woman masculine traits. 177 This did not mean, however, that he challenged
gender norms. On the contrary, he adopted a more overtly utilitarian argument, claiming that
women had to remain in the home. De Vaux represents this contradiction. Though she convinced
him of women’s intellectual abilities, he nevertheless used her to create a more circumscribed
vision of women’s nature. 178 After her death in 1846, he instituted a religion in her memory,
involving a set of rituals. 179 This became the basis for his new form of religious positivism, in
which he adopted subjective and spiritual thought. Here, once again, he viewed women as
morally pure and ideal. He wrote less about the more negative vision of the woman, though he
did argue that a woman not under male control would develop masculine vices, such as “pride
and vanity.” 180 In general, however, he reversed his earlier vision; where he had identified the
male as the ideal person, he now created the idea of woman as the representative of humanity. As
Offen has argued, however, this style of idealization “placed women on pedestals from which
they were forbidden to descend.” 181 In this way, he continued to argue for the kind of domestic
hierarchy which he had attempted to impose on Massin.
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When Comte created his Religion of Humanity, it appeared to be a contradiction. His
earlier work had defined humanity as becoming more rational and more scientific, leaving
religion behind. By the 1850s, however, he argued that the human race was becoming more
religious over time, 182 and that emotion, and not the intellect, was the most important aspect of
human nature. 183 Despite this shift in rhetoric, his basic goal remained the same: to create unity.
In this case, it was through religion and women, rather than science and rationality. To create his
new positivism, he reformulated the idea of progress. Rather than the development of masculine
rationality, it meant the increase of feminine emotion. Second, it meant transferring his theory of
social unity to a religious basis. Whereas earlier, he argued that scientific thought would unify
humanity under a coherent system of thought, he now argued that religion would form the
foundation for community. Like science, it would bring people together under an idea, but it
would first need to become unified. He believed that currently, religions were coming together
and becoming more similar. Positivism would complete the process, creating a universal
religion. 184 Because he defined femininity as constructive, he reversed his earlier thought and
made masculinity the destructive force in society. Rationalism, rather than the means to future
synthesis, instead resulted in the current era's “disastrous anarchy.” 185
Comte's solution was to make the emotions dominant in human nature. 186 It would create
“universal love,” further integrating the person into the collective. 187 Women were the key.
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Comte argued that men would pray to women, their “guardian angels,” 188 who would moralize 189
and socialize them. 190 Women would represent the human race itself. Comte believed that
humans had to be socialized in stages: through the family, to the larger society, 191 and through
the woman, to humanity in general. 192 First, men would worship women in a private setting.
Then, he would worship humanity as a whole. 193 This would lead to a more unified human race.
Nations would dissolve and city states would take their place. 194 Europe would come under a
common, positivist government. Then, this would expand to the rest of the world, creating a
unified global society encompassing all races. In this way, he reiterated Saint-Simon's concept of
a universal civilizing mission, but with a religious basis. 195
In a way, Comte seemed to undermine the old hierarchies. He still viewed men,
Europeans and the elite classes as representing power and intellect in various ways, 196 but came
to view those qualities in more negative terms. In his view, the intellect was dangerous and
needed to be subordinate. Power, as well, had to be reined in. For that reason, he wanted all large
governments and empires 197 to end and a form of chivalry to be instituted. 198 Along with this, he
wanted the qualities of morality and sociability to be dominant, qualities which he identified with
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the subordinate parts of society. He viewed women as representing morality and emotion,
making up “the greatest personification of humanity.” 199 This was similar to his older view.
Then, he had viewed women as moralizers. Here, however, he viewed them as corresponding to
positive thought itself. He argued that women thought in simpler, more general and “abstract”
terms, 200 which defined his new form of positivism. For that reason they were not necessarily
inferior, and in fact represented a progressive force. Workers played a similar role. They too were
moral and emotional, 201 and they too had valuable, unique intellectual contributions. 202 They had
a practical, social understanding which would aid positivism.203
In this new theory, women who previously had been an almost inhuman aberration,
became humanity itself. This was true in literal terms, in his representation of the human race as
a woman. 204 It was true in theoretical terms as well. As he argued that history led to unity and
solidarity, with the mind developing toward an essentially moral ideal. Women were all of these
things: moral, emotional and social. Yet there was a further complication: women did not own
those characteristics, but simply inspired them. They were emotional, but the key was that they
could develop men's emotion. 205 They were moral, but mostly inspired morality in men. They
were not, in fact, social at all, but only socialized men through the man's own feelings. The
ultimate symbol of this was the “déesse,” Comte's vision of humanity. As he explained, she
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would be represented in the form of a thirty year old woman holding a child. 206 This was, in fact,
Comte's muse, de Vaux. 207 He used her image to create a universal muse, which would inspire
and enlighten men throughout society. This had several implications. First, by identifying women
with this idea, he idealized them as perfect, but also removed all subjectivity. Men, through
women, would become part of society. This created an idea of elite men as problematic: they
were disorderly, individualized, and overly-intellectual. This served to undermine ideas of
hierarchy, but it also reinforced them in a concrete way. First, because these men were
problematic, they needed others to serve them. For that reason, women and the working class
were essentially there to guide and moralize elite men, and had no purpose of their own. As
Comte argued, women's role was “to form and perfect men.” 208
Second, because elite men were problematic, and women and workers perfect, he argued
that hierarchy was not only necessary, but beneficial to the subordinate groups. In his view,
power was indeed corrupting; it held back progress and kept the privileged classes from moving
forward. For that reason, workers and women could never have power or active roles. It would
ruin their unique virtues. Workers had to remain in their current status, outside of authority, in
order to maintain their moral role. 209 Women had to remain in the home, under male care, in
order to be feminine. 210 He suggested that they wanted this to be so. In contrast to contemporary
concerns over the role of women and workers, and these groups own efforts to improve their
status, Comte represented their lives as idealized, simple, and fixed. Thus, working life was
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leisurely and easy, giving them time to think and moralize their superiors. 211 Women, as well,
favored a domestic role and rejected the feminist movement. 212 There was a contradiction. He
argued that women would welcome patriarchal care, but he also suggested that it was a burden
which they had to learn to accept. 213 He wrote that “[women's] education will prepare them to
understand that domination, far from elevating them, will degrade them by attaining for them the
elevation that they must only gain through love.” 214 In this way, he reversed meanings to achieve
his ends, remaking power as weakness, subordination as elevation, liberation as subordination,
and social construction as nature.
Ultimately, the point was to create a coherent system. For that reason, the individual had
to serve the collective. 215 In this case, the individual was the man, and the ideal was the woman.
She had a natural, unchanging quality. Throughout the progression of history, she sought a single
ideal: a strong domestic culture. Progress, in fact, meant the development of this system, in
which the man increasingly took her under his care. 216 Thus, Comte combined the two ideas, the
constructed and the natural; it came about over time, but somehow corresponded to women's
nature. He reconciled this through his new definition of progress, which meant “the development
of order.” 217 Thus, progress was not really change, but a return to the origins of human
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thought. 218 Women would take on a role that was somehow theirs from the start.
In a way, women represented the past. He argued that they favored and tried to maintain
the values of the medieval era. 219 In another way, they were the future: they represented the unity
of humanity that would come about. Despite that, they were simply an image. He argued that
only a woman could represent humanity. 220 Yet only a man could be fully part of it. Women,
again, would unify men into a collective humanity. Thus, it becomes clear that, although a
woman stood for the human race, men were the real subjects, and the only ones who would
actually make up the collective. Women, after all, would remain in the home, protected from
society. Men, in contrast, would have to venture out into the world. That was the real danger:
men, unlike women, were agents. That was why they were problematic.
Comte’s idea of history viewed male nature as a problem from the beginning. He argued
that women's place became increasingly improved throughout history, from Greek civilization, to
the Roman and finally the medieval periods. Over time, domesticity formed and the woman took
a greater part in the home. 221 The Middle Ages was the pinnacle of this development. It saw the
rise of a moral and religious system that elevated their role and brought their “emancipation.” 222
After this point, there was an unfortunate decline. Modern civilization rejected the medieval era
and turned to the ancient. 223 Women continued to maintain the emotional ideals of the Middle
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Ages, to moralize society, but their efforts were in vain. 224 Comte presented the course of
women's history as simple and domestic. His vision of utopia would essentially return to that
earlier course in bringing the woman into a more feminine society, which would ensure “the
ascendance of the heart over the mind.” 225 It is also essential to understand why he saw this as
progress. It helped woman, who favored the morality of the Middle Ages and wanted to return to
it. 226 At the same time, he viewed it as improving men. In Comte's narrative, each civilization
improved men by creating stronger domesticity. 227 This reached its peak under the Middle Ages,
in which wives and priests worked together to create a moralized, limited patriarchy. 228
Throughout, the problem was male power. History worked to limit it and bring it under control.
Thus, he valued chivalry, which created solidarity between the weak and strong in society. 229
Unfortunately, after this, society became corrupted. More precisely, it became masculinized. It
broke up, becoming divided and overly-intellectual. Comte's system would, ultimately, make
society feminine again. It would elevate emotion and unity. In this light, the image of the déesse
takes on a new meaning. She was perfection, of course, but an ideal not just for women, but for
men as well. She was unity, emotion, caring: all qualities that Comte wanted to create in modern
men.
This returns to the essential problem of power in Comte's system. It is clear that he
created a hierarchy. When he imagined humanity as a woman, he set an ideal that would take
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away their active role. When he argued that women had to stay in the home to moralize men, he
did so to restrict their movement and power. When he argued that women had to be chaste to
maintain their purity, he wanted to maintain a perfect feminine nature. 230 Yet the point was not to
fix women's nature, but to ameliorate that of men. Women represented an ideal for human nature,
based on sociability and unity. In the home, family life would do two things: integrate the man
and develop his emotions. The first took several stages: through ancestors, then siblings, then
marriage, and finally fatherhood. The result would ultimately develop the man's feelings of
solidarity and altruism. 231 These virtues, again, were feminine. He viewed women as essentially
selfless and morally pure. 232
Comte's rhetoric of women's greatness was hardly unique. The idea that women, because
of their maternal nature, were destined for the home was dominant in the nineteenth century. 233
There was, however, an innovation in Comte's work. Where others, such as contemporary
antifeminist Jules Michelet, argued that women were inferior and had to be controlled, Comte
created a more androgynous vision of society. According to Michelet, a men should marry a
young woman and take over her life, becoming her “father,” “brother,” and “mother.” 234 Comte,
in contrast, argued that women under positivism would exercise control over men, making them
more like women. He argued that marriage would bring together the positive, complementary
natures of the two sexes into a superior whole. 235 Women would give feminine qualities to men
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and men would give masculine qualities to women. 236 It was clear, however, which was the most
important. As Comte established in his historical narrative, the modern era had created a crisis of
masculinization. It had positive qualities, such as the creation of progress, but it was ultimately
destructive. Thus, men were destructive and women constructive, corresponding to his two
stages of the revolution, the metaphysical and the positive. The second part, again, needed to be
emotional and moral. To achieve this, he theorized a new, moral power, to replace the old,
political one. It would be based on the chivalric principal, “devotion of the strong for the weak,
veneration of the weak for the strong.” 237 This principal could be read several ways: as a
justification for patriarchal power, as a paternalistic ideal of government, or as an idealization of
altruistic sentiment. It was not, however, limited to the sexes, or the classes, or the races,
comprised the whole of society.
In Comte’s argument, military power would end. Nationalism would end. Modern
government would end. In their places, he hoped for a universal chivalry. Women, workers, and
priests would renounce power. 238 At the same time, each would hold influence over the other:
women over philosophers and workers, 239 the poor over the philosophers, 240 and the priests over
the wealthy and powerful. 241 Under the final positivist system, women and the working class
would both take part in the international governing body. 242 Hierarchy would still exist, but its
values would become fluid: primitive religion would be greater than European science, the poor
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greater than the powerful, and feminine weakness greater than masculine strength. This system
was indeed imperialistic and authoritarian. He did want to define a role for everyone and bring
everyone into the same system. Yet it was not imperialism based on a desire for power, but on a
desire to end power struggle after years of government changes, revolts, and revolutions. He
wanted, ultimately, to undo the masculine power of the modern era and replace it with what he
saw as the stable, passive, pacific femininity of times past.
There are at least two ways to interpret Comte's gender ideology. In the first, Comte was
an antifeminist who used his maternal ideal to oppress and limit the lives of real women. A
contemporary, feminist Jenny D'Héricourt argued in 1860 that the sexes were more alike, and
that women would see his supposedly complimentary views for what they were. She advised that
one “be sure that every true woman will laugh at the raiment of clouds which you pretend to give
her, at the incense with which you wish to asphyxiate her; for she cares no longer for
adoration.” 243 Nearly a century later, philosopher Simone de Beauvoir argued that Comte's vision
of the moral woman was indeed oppressive, and that “to identify Woman with Altruism is to
guarantee man absolute rights to her devotion; it is to impose on women a categorical mustbe.” 244 From the other perspective, which I have employed in this chapter, woman was only one
half of Comte's vision of society. He identified women with morality and tradition, but men with
all of the worst elements of modernity: egoism, corruption, and excessive rationalization. As this
suggests, I view the two interpretations as one; to understand Comte's idea of the modern, one
must understand his ideas of both women and men. In addition, though he criticized the
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masculine aspect of modernization, he remained thoroughly patriarchal. He identified women
with morality, but in a passive way; men were the true actors, and women their passive muses.
His ideas thus reflected the feminine allegories of his time. As scholars have discussed, female
figures often embodied virtues, such as reason, which they supposedly could not possess. 245
Finally, Comte's concern over women's role became more pressing in subsequent
decades. As de Beauvoir suggested, Comte's theory was prescriptive as well as descriptive. It
made women responsible for society's welfare. In the fin-de-siècle, amidst fears of degeneration
and population decline, two images of the woman emerged; the good mother and the New
Woman. The former served society by having children while the latter abandoned her duty. 246
This new iteration of a familiar antinomy reveals the dual nature of domestic ideology. It
idealized women but also vilified them, making them both the saviors and corrupters of society.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ILLUSION OF CIVILIZATION: GUSTAVE LE BON AND THE
CRITIQUE OF POSITIVISM

Though he criticized revolutionary thought, Comte maintained many of the assumptions
of the Enlightenment, including a belief in progress, reason, and science. He challenged and
questioned these ideas, but he nevertheless believed that society could make the transition from a
religious to a secular basis. In this light, Gustave Le Bon’s psychological work appears to be the
antithesis to everything for which positivism had stood. He argued that the intellect was powerless, progress was harmful, and that humanity was irrational. In his vision of modernity, the veil
of civilization lifted and humanity returned to a state of violent struggle and destruction. “The
man may hide his bloody instincts behind sonorous words, but whatever he does, these instincts
are still terribly alive.” 247 Le Bon thus represents the fin-de-siècle’s pessimism as well as its rejection of positivism.248 I argue that his ideas were more complex. From the beginning of his career, he held two competing theories; one, a positivist idea of science and progress, and the other,
a criticism of positivism. I argue that this tension continued the basic uncertainties over modernity which were at the heart of positivism from the beginning. Later, he rejected positivism, but
maintained a belief in the inevitability of change. Like Comte, he sought to reconcile forces of
order and progress to found a new society. Yet the utopianism of the past was no longer viable.
He argued, instead, for the subjective values of power, authority, and nation to maintain order. He
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also used the language of gender to express his vision of modernity, but with a more masculine
ideal. Where Comte viewed the Romantic qualities of feminine virtue as forming the new society, Le Bon advocated struggle, power, and domination.

The Failure of Reason

In contrast to Comte’s pacifism, subsequent positivists in the Third Republic advocated
ideas of racial struggle and domination. They viewed the West as subjugating or wiping out what
they viewed as the lower races. 249 Le Bon, who began his anthropological work in the 1870s,
was characteristic of this era. He argued that a civilization’s progress followed a natural path;
like Darwinian evolution, change was slow and had to follow a set progression. 250 Struggle was
necessary for progress, and peace brought weakness. 251 The end result of development was
inequality. He outlined a new study of craniology, in which the scientist would study, not the
average skull size of each race, but the varying proportions of sizes within a population. 252 He
used this to discover that, while lower races had generally similar sizes, the development of a
race brought greater disparity. This was because progress itself was fundamentally anti-
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egalitarian; industry created the intellectual elite while lowering the intelligence of the masses. 253
Workers, peasants, and women remained in a primitive state while superior men became
greater. 254 They alone defined the place of a people in the overall hierarchy of races. His idea
was important for several reasons. First, it created an empirical refutations of revolutionary ideas
of equality. Second, it formed ideas of social inequality as not just analogous to, but a
fundamental part of racial hierarchy. Finally, it represented the new, naturalistic idea of society in
positivism. Where Comte had viewed society as a natural phenomenon, subject to scientific laws,
Le Bon viewed it as itself based on nature. Human nature thus became transparent; one need
only study the skull to see the development of hierarchy, and the rise of the superior European
man. This man represented all of the virtues of the West: intellectual superiority and progress.
Yet, while this man was intellectually superior, his intellect was a problem; Le Bon, like Comte,
was ambivalent about the rational Western man.
Le Bon's theories exemplified the fin-de-siècle's ambivalent idea of modernity, which
stood for both scientific achievement as well as social decline. 255 Le Bon viewed the West as the
progressive part of the world. It rose above all others, achieving heights of advancement. At the
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same time, its very progress was self-destructive. Industrialization created prosperity for the
bourgeoisie, but poverty for the workers. 256 The family broke apart and traditional relationships
failed. 257 Religion and belief faded. In all of this, the West lost its unifying ideas, its “ardor and
youth,” its “enthusiasm and energy,” and became decadent. 258 Socialism posed a new problem.
People saw this as progress, but it was really regress; it represented a return to a primitive
communality, a flight from modern hierarchy. 259 Though Le Bon described these problems as
Western, they were also specific to French discourse. After the French loss of the FrancoPrussian War, intellectuals such as Ernest Renan viewed French culture as weak, unfit for the
modern struggle for survival. 260 Some argued for a new form of conflict to strengthen the nation:
colonialism. It would It would strengthen the French man and revive the nation. 261 Le Bon
sought a similar regeneration, but he saw contemporary colonialism as flawed. The French had
attempted to spread their civilization to the rest of the world, but that was impossible because
“only time can accomplish these great transformations.” 262 The British exploited India, ruining
it and causing famine. Thus, the civilizing mission in fact led to a loss of civilization; Le Bon
argued that “the European in the East loses all of his qualities and descends, in terms of morality,
well below those whom he exploits.” 263 In this way, Le Bon criticized, not just colonialism, but
the idea of Western superiority itself. He identified the West with a decadent, enervated
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intellectualism. Arab civilization, in contrast, represented a primitive vitality and unity. They
followed irrational religious ideas, but this irrationality provided their force; it gave them
strength and unity. They retained “the solidity which we have lost.” 264 Le Bon even questioned
the ideal of rationality itself. He argued that “it is the character of a people, and not its
intelligence, which inevitably determines its evolution in history.” 265 He qualified this by stating
that intelligence was more important in the long term, 266 but his conviction seemed weak; he
argued that barbarians could overcome decadent civilizations 267 and that the East could one day
rise up and economically surpass the West. 268 Le Bon, like Comte, used the idea of the primitive
to criticize the modern.
In a way, Le Bon's ideas are reminiscent of the Romantic tradition, which viewed each
civilization as an organic whole with a fixed, unique development. 269 Similarly, Le Bon viewed
each society as particular. They each had a unique psychology and development, and could not
adopt the culture of any other. Each had a unified spirit or “soul,” 270 bringing the collective into
solidarity. In India, a race was “a single being constituted by the reunion of thousands of
constantly replaced individuals.” 271 This unity grew like a plant, and “the current state of a
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people is always the consequence of its past, like the plant is the consequent of the grain.” 272 Yet
Le Bon was a positivist. He argued for viewing society as a scientific phenomenon, subject to
scientific laws. 273 Using Darwinism, he argued that the growth of a society, like the evolution of
a species, had to be slow and gradual. 274 In addition, he rejected the Romantic idea of the
primitive. Though he criticized Western industry, he viewed people in undeveloped societies as
savage and violent, similar to animals. 275 Le Bon's thought is thus difficult to categorize; he
valued tradition, but also progress, objectivity, but also the subjective. The key, once again, is the
concept of rationality; he viewed rationalization as necessary for development, but also
insufficient to found a social order.
Le Bon viewed rationalism as a dangerous force. It destroyed morality and perhaps
society as a whole. 276 Le Bon urged caution. He argued that it was the power of heredity which
formed a people and its identity. 277 Most importantly, it created a moral discipline. Hereditary
influence was the reason why modern people retained their civilized state even when they left
Western civilization.278 The forces of rationalization, in contrast, were destructive; like Comte,
Le Bon viewed science as replacing religious conceptions. 279 Unlike Comte, however, he viewed
reason as insufficient. “Reason can teach man, but it cannot create a religion for him.” 280
Because humanity still needed a religion, they found it in the dangerous ideas of the
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revolutionary movement. 281 Le Bon used the death of religion as a symbol of the larger decline
of civilization, which he expressed in the scientific idiom of the time. He wrote that Christianity
followed the inexorable law in which everything “is born, grows, declines, and dies.” 282
Eventually, humanity would die out, and then the world would die. 283 Everything followed the
law of entropy; even belief.
Along with this thermodynamic idea of decline, he constructed a contrasting vision of
progress; one which echoed the Enlightenment ideas of human perfectibility. He argued that, in
time, humanity would become something new, with a totally moralized nature. National lines
would break down and a global community would form. 284 Even rationality could become
constructive, and an empirical sense of heredity could found a religion based on the passing of
generations. 285 Was this a contradiction in Le Bon's thought? How could this eminently
deterministic thinker have adopted the very utopianism which he so often rejected? It seems
possible that his views simply represented the ambivalent nature of the century's idea of
progress; like Comte, he saw progress as both constructive and destructive. He did adopt this
ambivalence, but he also followed another aspect of Comte's vision; the division between the
moral and the material. 286
Le Bon argued that there were two forms of progress in society; the first, involving
scientific and technological change, and the second involving the moral “character” of a people.
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Each moved forward, but at different rates; while science rapidly advanced, morality remained
behind. 287 Humanity, despite its advances, retained its violent and barbaric nature. 288 There was
thus a fundamental clash in development, with the scientific breaking down the old moral order
without anything to replace it. In the future, humanity could attain a new synthesis in which the
moral and the intellectual came into accord, but that time had not yet come. For the moment,
society remained in a state of transitional crisis, not yet ready to advance. In this context, his
rejection of the civilizing mission took on a new meaning. He argued that the less advanced, such
as Indians, were unready for Western civilization. Similarly, the Western man himself, despite his
civilized state, was unready for the very modernity which he had built. All of this supported a
universal vision of hierarchy and authority; humanity was uncivilized, so it needed to be
controlled, both in the metropole and in the colonies. Yet, though his theory was centered on the
abstract, civilized man, he identified harmful change with those elements of the world which he
viewed as traditional: women and non-Western people. He viewed them as the key to
maintaining order; each had a fixed place in society, and would topple the social order if they left
it.

The Defense of Inequality

After the mid-nineteenth century, both feminists and anti-feminists adopted a common
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idea of women's moral, maternal nature. Feminist Maria Deraismes argued that women served a
vital function, creating unity and solidarity in the family. 289 Others, such as anti-feminists Jules
Michelet and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, viewed gender difference and marriage as founding
morality and civilization.290 This reverence for the feminine did not, however, preclude virulent
misogyny; Proudhon viewed the woman as a beautiful “representation of the ideal,” 291 but also
as “an instrument of reproduction.” 292 Le Bon continued this idea of women as both superior and
inferior, but incorporated an evolutionary, materialist perspective. He argued that women indeed
had a basic altruistic nature. They sought to serve and to care for others, whether they were
children, animals, or objects. He saw this not as a true morality, but as an animal-like instinct. He
wrote that girls naturally had “a foundation of sweetness, sympathy, pity, and devotion to the
weak and unfortunate, as instinctive for them as the bird's need to care for its eggs [couver].” 293
Women's beneficence was natural but also limited. They desired to serve, but had no
understanding of morality, and could not take public roles. 294
He used similarly naturalistic language to denigrate women elsewhere. He argued that
they had smaller brains and an instinctive nature, like gorillas and other animals. 295 This
primitive nature was vital; it made them caring and intuitive, making them the perfect helpers
and servants of men. He argued that “the ingenious tenderness of the woman, her charming
weakness, and her unthinking naïveté (naïve inconscience) makes life tolerable for the man
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crushed by the harsh labor of our refined civilization.” 296 Furthermore, because women were
intellectually inferior, similar to children, they were able to better understand and educate
children. 297 Thus, Le Bon's ideal was a totally altruistic woman who lived to serve others. He
illustrated this with the case of birds that “contract indissoluble unions in which they demonstrate
the most faithful and tender sentiments, and the love shown by the female for the male is so deep
that she soon dies of grief when death takes him from her.” 298 Some sought to change this natural
order.
Le Bon education for girls as another example of blind belief in universalism.
Republicans thought that education could remake the individual, shaping “every French mind
into a single mold. One seeks to pour the minds of the blacks, Arabs, and Asians of our colonies
into this same mold. One now wants to pour the minds of French women into it as well.” 299 The
result would be disastrous. He argued that equal education would overwhelm women, making
them unhappy and physically ill. Ultimately, they would “sacrifice their years of beauty, of
youth” 300 as well as hopes for a family, for nothing. They could not compete professionally with
men and would turn to nihilism. He wrote that their hopeless situation would make them
“déclassées, thunderous rebels, enemies of men, of whom they see themselves as equal, and of
the social order, of which they pretend to be victims.” 301 Le Bon argued, instead, for a limited
education for women, which would “prepare them to be excellent wives.” 302 Was this a
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contradiction in Le Bon's thought? If women wanted to be mothers, and were naturally suited for
it, then why was this special education necessary? He believed that the social order was based on
nature, but that a powerful, irrational idea threatened it: equality. He viewed this as an allencompassing idea which was spreading throughout the world. 303
By the late 1880s, Le Bon had developed a complete theory of progress as the
development of hierarchy. He argued that, as society developed, the races, sexes, and classes
became more unequal. The superior man rose above the rest, claiming a place as the only true,
mature individual of the world. All others remained in a state of primitive, savage or childlike
underdevelopment. Several events brought a new theory to the fore. The republicans established
universal suffrage, 304 expanded colonization, 305 and secularized education. 306 In this context, Le
Bon constructed a double idea of progress which led to both the growth of inequality and a
contrary trend toward social leveling and equality. His target was the idea of universalism. He
argued that it began in the European context, in the French attempts to spread their superior
civilization to the rest of the world. When that failed, the French sought to transform their
colonial possessions, remaking their subjects into French citizens. 307 This was similarly futile.
He argued that people had totally incompatible mentalities. The West was progressive and
secular, while the East was traditional and archaic. 308 The latter were “immobilized in an eternal
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dream,” 309 incapable of entering the modern world. At this point, the false idea of universalism
once again entered metropolitan society. Because they gave full education to their colonized
subjects, the French would have to provide it for French women as well. 310 Here, again, the ideal
of equality clashed with reality. He argued that women, like non-Western people were irrational
and inferior, incapable of learning.
Le Bon thus constructed a thorough critique of egalitarian thought which set a stable idea
of national identity and particularity, in which, against a destructive idea of universal human
unity, which sought to remake the world in the image of the supposedly superior people. The
latter idea, he argued, was the cause of all of modern history's greatest disasters, including war
and revolution. He wrote that it was “this chimerical notion of the equality of men which has
shaken the world, brought about an enormous revolution in Europe, launched America into a
bloody war of secession and brought all of France's colonies to a state of lamentable
decadence.” 311 Le Bon wrote this statement in 1894, during a key transitional point in French
history. By this time, the Third Republic was securely established. The government had moved
toward the right, and the clash between the secularists and the Catholic conservatives had
abated. 312 Yet several cracks had begun to appear in this stability. The popular movement in
support of General Georges Boulanger developed, based on militarism and anti-German
sentiment, and seemed to challenge the government. 313 It introduced a new populist, nationalist
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right. 314 At the same time, a number of far left movements developed. Socialism grew in power
and anarchists staged a series of bombing attacks. 315 In this context, Le Bon found a new symbol
for the disastrous power of equality: the crowd.

“The Era of Crowds”

Despite the relative stability of the Third republic government, new scientific theories
added a new dimension to existing fears of the revolutionary masses. 316 Psychologists JeanMartin Charcot and Hippolyte Bernheim formulated theories of suggestion in which the
unaccountable forces of subconscious influence drove the individual's actions. 317 Debora
Silverman argues that their work introduced an idea of irrationality into popular discourse and
“[called] into question the Enlightenment legacy of self and social mastery.” 318 In this context,
Le Bon formed a theory of the collective as the new power in modern society. The old political
elite faded in importance. The masses emerged in their place, ushering in “the ERA OF
CROWDS.” 319 Like previous commentators, Le Bon viewed the masses as inferior; he argued
that they lacked reasoning ability320 and required strong government. 321

314

William D. Irvine, The Boulanger Affair Revisited: Royalism, Boulangism, and the origins of the Radical Right in
France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 12-18.
315
Agulhon, French Republic, 70-5.
316
For earlier fears of the crowd, see Jaap Van Ginneken, Crowds, Psychology, and Politics 1871-1899 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 20-48; Gay L. Gullickson, Unruly Women of Paris: Images of the Commune
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 52-4.
317
Silverman, Art Nouveau, 78-91.
318
Ibid., 76.
319
Emphasis in original. Le Bon, Psychologie des foules, 3.
320
Ibid., 100-1.

67

Yet this was more than mere class prejudice. Le Bon viewed the crowd as an allencompassing theory, representing the basic irrationality of humanity. He argued that when the
man entered the crowd, he lost his civilized nature, “descend[ing] several degrees on the scale of
civilization.” 322 This was true for everyone, regardless of intelligence and education. “The
suffrage of forty academics is no better than that of forty water carriers.” 323 The collective
descended to the level of its least intelligent members, which Le Bon characterized in gendered
and racialized terms. He argued that the crowd was “feminine” 324 and emotionally unstable, like
a woman. 325 It was illogical, 326 like “completely primitive beings.” 327 This was clearly a
criticism of a democratic society in which the voice of the masses drowned out the elite.
Le Bon's theory was more than anti-democratic; he described the superior man, not just
as losing his privilege, but his intelligence as well. This revealed the underlying irrationality of
the mind, in which “the role of the unconscious is immense and that of reason is very small.” 328
Le Bon viewed irrationality as a universal guiding force of history. 329 Its form, however, was
changing. Where once, the nation and religion were humanity's key illusions, it was now the
illusion of equality in the socialist movement. 330 Le Bon's figure of the man in the crowd
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represented the fate of the individual at this “period of transition and anarchy,” 331 standing
amidst the dehumanizing forces of modernity. Where Comte had viewed bourgeois culture as the
dehumanizing element, Le Bon identified dehumanization with the illusion of the labor
movement, which sought a return to primitive communism.332
Le Bon described socialism as an irrational impulse, “a reaction of the collectivity against
individuality, a return to the past.” 333 It sought to bring about homogeneity, which Le Bon
attributed to racial others and the European past. Anarchism, similarly, would bring about a
primitive society. The latter would dismantle modern society altogether, reducing it to a primitive
state. 334 From there, “humanity would pass through each of the forms through which it had to
successively cross: savagery, slavery, barbarity, etc.” 335 Each movement threatened to impose an
unnatural equality by either restructuring society or removing the structure all together. The two
actions appear synonymous for Le Bon, because for him the true mark of civilization was
hierarchy. In this sense, socialism, along with the civilizing mission, formed a unified challenge
to hierarchy. While the civilizing mission and gender equality threatened to elevate the inferior
elements in society, these revolutionaries sought to bring down that which was superior. The
result was the same in all cases: leveling, and thus savagery. Yet the origin of this problem was
not in the empire, but in the events of 1789.
The idea of heredity was central to nineteenth century thought. Degeneration theory
posited modernity as disease, with social ills translating to physical ills, passing from generation
331
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to generation. 336 Revolution followed the same pattern. It grew from unhealthy settings, spread
like a disease, and reappeared over time, in new forms. 337 For Le Bon, all of history passed in the
same way. Revolution, that supposed break with the past, in fact did little; equality and modern
rights would have happened anyway, as part of general modernization. Its only real
accomplishment was its massive death toll. 338 He viewed the Revolution as part of continuity, as
a manifestation of a continuing process of social disorder based on irrationality and social
influence. The various revolutionary actions, from the September Massacres to the Commune,
were simply various forms of mass psychology, revealing an underlying savagery within human
nature. 339 He wrote that “among many people ferocity is a restrained, but never repressed,
instinct.” 340 For that reason, revolution became the key to modern history, representing
modernity itself; first, because it stood for the general rise of mass power, and second, because it
became an unending repetition, standing for the cyclical process of modern degeneration.
Revolution also played a more active role. Though its attempts at modernization were futile, it
still had a disastrous impact. By attempting to impose equality, it contradicted the normal
development of society, which was toward greater hierarchy. 341 This hierarchy, in turn, was
responsible for continuing progress; he argued that only elite intellectuals could further the

336

Ruth Harris discusses the idea of social setting as causing degeneration. Ruth Harris, Murders and Madness:
Medicine, Law, and Society in the Fin de siècle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 51-5.
337
For the idea of poor neighborhoods as breeding revolution, see David H. Pinkney, Napoleon III and the
Rebuilding of Paris (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 9-10. For the theme of revolution as symbol of
degeneration, see Pick, Faces of Degeneration, 59-72; Harris, Murders, 77-8.
338
Le Bon, Politique, 197.
339
For his analysis of the two events as manifestations of crowd psychology, see Le Bon, Foules, 147-52. For the
idea of irrationality as guiding the revolutionary masses, see Le Bon, La Révolution française et la psychologie des
révolutions, (Rev ed., Paris: Les Amis de Gustave Le Bon, 1983), 52-9.
340
Ibid., 186.
341
Ibid., 228-2.

70

course of civilization.342 Without them, Europe would lose its superior nature, based on
continual advancement, and would regress to an inferior stage.
In summary, Le Bon's ideas appear to be in complete accord, from his argument against
the civilizing mission to his argument against revolution. His theories legitimized social norms
and discredited drastic change. He saw progress as tending toward greater inequality, so attempts
to impose equality meant a reversion to a primitive state. Revolution then appeared regressive,
moving against his idea of progress. Le Bon’s theory system located racial superiority
exclusively in the civilized European male. This man was the only one with the intellect and the
rationality to understand the world around him and to act on it. He held the right to power over
what he viewed as the inferior people of the world: women, workers, and other races. Yet Le
Bon's ideas were more complicated. First, the European male was not rational, but savage.
Revolution did not contradict historical development, but advanced its course. Le Bon thus held
two contradictory theories, one conservative and the other rejecting stability as impossible. The
rest of this chapter will analyze this contradiction.

The Decline of the European Man

Le Bon's idea of progress, more than simply justifying imperialism and patriarchy,
represented ambivalence about man’s role in modern society. Le Bon argued that modern
hierarchical society represented change and progress because it involved male elites rising above
342
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the collectivity and asserting control over the inferior elements. Le Bon viewed this as a delicate
balance, which he represented through the language of race. He discussed a fixed, racialized
“national character.” 343 He used this against socialism, portraying the latter as an undesirable
change. 344 The movement would end with disaster, bringing about class conflict. 345 He viewed
society as being at stake, identifying the current order with order itself. He identified that order,
in turn, with racial identity. He wrote that “the anarchy and social struggles which we have
described manifest above all among peoples that have attempted to break with their past and of
which the mentality has consequently lost its stability.” 346 This represents his rejection of the
Enlightenment idea of universal human perfectibility. As he argued concerning the civilizing
mission, one could not change human nature. It had to evolve on its own over time. He applied
the same argument to French society. The French Revolution, he argued, represented the false
idea that laws could change society. 347 Equality was unnatural. It contradicted progress and the
normal development of society. 348 It appears that the key idea is nature. He divided the idea of
progress into two: one a natural progress that led to inequality and male superiority, and the other
an unnatural progress that led to equality and the breakdown of society. This latter, he argued,
was not progress at all. “What many minds blinded by chimeras consider progress is simply
regression toward inferior forms of existence.” 349 He discredited the idea of equality by
identifying it as both natural and unnatural. It was natural because it was driven by instinct, and
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led to an early state of society. It was unnatural because it contradicted his idea of progress,
which moved forward away from that state. Yet he naturalized it in another sense. Though he
argued that revolution could not affect any real change, and that its goals were impossible, he
also viewed equality as a real problem. Any attempt at social change seemed poised to bring
about primitive homogeneity. This was true for socialism and revolution. It was even true,
implicitly, for gender equality and the civilizing mission. Progress was thus delicate and could be
overturned at any moment. As such, patriarchy was delicate as well. The European man, he
argued, could be brought down to a feminine, savage level by stepping out of the social order.
Even symbolically leaving that order, by joining the homogeneous crowd, could return him to
man's evolutionary starting point. Progress was thus natural and unnatural, inevitable but
uncertain, progressive but regressive.
If Le Bon's imperialist progress was weak and imperiled, then the “unnatural” form of
progress in contrast appeared eminently natural. Revolution was not just failure because its ideals
were impossible, but because they represented the inevitable course of historical development. In
his view, the Old Regime started a policy of government expansion that continued through the
1789 revolution, through the subsequent years to the current socialist movement. 350 This series of
developments, though seemingly marked by conflict and frequent change in regime, was instead
a single line of development. It brought state centralization and expansion, culminating in the
socialist vision of society. 351 That latest iteration was thus inevitable, part of a “natural phase of
evolution.” 352 For Le Bon, it was ultimately about the rise of government and the diminution of
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the individual. 353 The result was disastrous, and “the weakest traces of initiative, of individual
liberty, [are] suppressed.” 354 It was also universal, common to all ideology. He argued, “all these
parties: republicans, monarchists, socialists, etc., have, as I have already said, an identical
conception of the state.” 355 In this way, it was beyond politics, a characteristic of the French
race. 356 The French believed in the power of government and education. 357 They believed in
universalism and that “all men are made the same and should consequently think and feel the
same way.” 358 The problem, then, was the idea of intervention and change. It, again, contradicted
racial development. It was also part of that same development and racial identity. History, after
all, was the product of irrationality. 359 The crowd brought these ideas together. It was specific to
the French race, representing its nature. Collective influence worked on a subconscious level,
driving its members regardless of their individual qualities. For that reason, the crowd
represented not just the inferior part of the population, but the basic racial identity of the nation.
Thus, by making these developments universal, inevitable, and racial, Le Bon placed savagery in
the past, present, and future of modern society.
Humanity, Le Bon argued, began with a “crowd.” 360 Then, over time, it developed into a
civilization. “The crowd became a people, and this people would be able to leave barbarity.” 361 It
was ultimately social structure that defined modernity and racial identity. Other races were
353
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inferior because they were “crowds.” European races, in contrast, became individuals, their
identity defined by stratification. This stratification then began to break down. Religion and
nationalism declined. Europeans lost their former “ardor and youth.” 362 The result was a general
weakening of society and loss of social solidarity. 363 “Having arrived at a certain level of power
and complexity, civilization stops growing, and, when it no longer grows, it is soon condemned
to decline.” 364 Thus, civilizing was an action, constantly resisting the contrary force of decivilizing. The latter brought about the modern-day moment, defined by the rise of crowds. The
entire process was inevitable. “Passing from barbarity to civilization in following a dream, then
declining and dying when that dream has lost its force, such is the cycle of the life of a
people.” 365 It was really the life of men. Le Bon viewed modernity as feminizing and decivilizing, which implicitly excluded his idea of the feminine and uncivilized. In addition,
because women and non-Europeans could never attain true civilization, they could not take part
in this arc of progress and regression. Instead, the European man was the sole subject of history.
He was the only one who could move forward, so he was the only one who could fall behind.
Yet, by positioning him within this arc, Le Bon seems to undermine his superiority. Man became
superior through the development of intelligence, by rising above the inferior elements. Le Bon's
idea of progress was exactly the opposite. It led to the rise of central power, the loss of the
individual and his masculine strengths. It led, above all, to a loss of civilization: the element that
set the European male apart. The crowd was symbolic of that process. Daniel Pick argues, “The
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crowd inverted the law of evolution and moved from present to past.” 366 It also inverted the
order of representation and made the European male subject to imperialist discourse.
The positivist idea of history was predicated on the idea of the Western man as
perfectible, capable of reaching a state of objectivity from which he could view and guide the
development of the rest of the world. Anne McClintock discusses this vision of history in
imperialist culture, in what she labels “panoptical time.” She argues that representations of the
civilizing process cast the Western man as an invisible observer, viewing the paths of the lesser
people, as representations of the past, moving forward in history. 367 Le Bon's idea of the crowd
inverted these ideas in every way. In his argument, the rational man became the visible object,
rather than the unseen subject, and acted out his course of development. This man lost his
rationality and became analogous to primitives, in the same way that primitives were analogous
to his own past in panoptical time. In addition, because the crowd mind was representative of his
racial nature, it cast savagery as the man's normal state, and thus made rationality impossible.
This was the central point of Le Bon's work. He viewed the masses as an unstoppable,
destructive, and all-consuming force. 368 One could not improve them, because laws were
powerless against nature. 369 One could not use reason, because the irrational forces of “sentiment
and beliefs” had the greatest power over events. 370 Thus, Le Bon viewed history as leading
toward inevitable decline. He followed Comte's vision of abstract, scientific history, but updated
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for the fin-d-siècle, based on the era's sense of decline.
Though he deemed the positivist idea of reshaping human nature impossible, his vision of
controlling humanity appeared easier. Because crowds were weak-willed and impressionable, a
leader could control them by employing simple ideas. 371 This could be dangerous because crowd
leaders were often mentally ill demagogues. 372 But crowds also presented an opportunity. Le Bon
argued that, “always ready to rise up against a weak authority, the crowd submits to a strong
one.” 373 Thus, the government had to take a strong stand. It needed to suppress the socialist
threat. 374 It had to impose stronger criminal punishment. 375 Most of all, it had to understand the
forces of psychology, which would allow it to “lead men and manage events.” 376 Le Bon
presented his studies as the means to maintain order against the forces of decline. He gave those
in power a choice between two futures, one in which they took control of the chaotic masses, and
one in which the masses took control of them. 377 This was also gendered. In the latter, modernity
became feminized, with the superior man dissolving into a homogeneous inferiority. In the
former, masculine modernity took over this feminine chaos, which existed both in the crowd and
in man himself, and created a new order. Le Bon divided this vision into absolutes, into order and
disorder. This made modern society constantly threatened and undermined, in need on
reinforcement. In addition, by placing man into this delicate position, he promoted a specific
vision of masculinity based on power and struggle.
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Le Bon formed a Social Darwinist idea of masculinity. This had a particular meaning in
the era after the Franco-Prussian War. Renan argued that the German man was superior to the
French, and that “the German victory was the victory of the disciplined man over one who is not,
of the respectful, attentive, methodical man over one who is not.” 378 He saw the French man was
decadent and obsolete, weakened by his very culture. In the subsequent years, this sense of
weakness took various forms; the idea of depopulation, degeneration, and social change. It
remained, as well, a male problem; Christopher Forth argues that during the fin-de-siècle
commentators viewed modern life itself as “feminizing,” taking away the man's strength and
fitness. 379 Le Bon, like many others, had a solution: “force.” 380 He argued that struggle was
natural and normal, whether in colonial conflict or class conflict. 381 It was necessary for a
society's strength. 382 Without it, there would be a failure to develop, like in Africa, or decadence,
like in India. 383 Furthermore, it would increase in the future. He wrote that the coming era would
feature a number of conflicts, including both “wars of race and wars of ideas.” 384 To survive
amidst this tumult, France would need to maintain its strength; “Those who want to survive must
remain the strongest.” 385 This meant, above all, maintaining its national sentiment and “soul.”
Here, he echoed the ideas from German idealism, of a reality based on will and a nation based on
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an idea. 386 Le Bon argued, it was a nation's “will” that drove it to greatness. 387 Thus, the current
decline was a moral, rather than material failing, and could be remedies as such. It was modern
ideas—socialism, feminism, and above all equality—that drove France to ruin. To be revived,
France needed only to return to its old values of tradition and inequality; in effect, to restore the
French man to power. At the same time, this also meant creating a new man. Like Friedrich
Nietzsche, Le Bon theorized an individual who existed in constant struggle, using his
extraordinary will to shape reality. 388
Le Bon's thought represents a turning point in modern thought. He exemplified the finde-siècle rejection of rationalism and liberalism. 389 He argued that modernization, rather than
creating a utopian state, instead led to degeneration. The individual was violent and savage under
his veneer of civilization. The masses were chaotic and dangerous. Even though he dismissed
idealizations of progress, he was not a conservative. He believed in ideas of change, revolution,
and regeneration, but on a different basis; irrational ideals and beliefs, rather than scientific
truths. This was the key to Le Bon's lasting impact on Europe. He viewed the masses as chaotic
and irrational, but also identified this irrationality as the true driving force of change. Law,
revolution, and traditional politics were bankrupt. Only the force of illusion, and the ideal of the
nation, mattered. Le Bon's era was a transitional point, between the ideas of the old right and the
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new, populist, nationalist right, which founded fascism. 390
As Stanley Payne has argued, fascism rejected liberalism, but not the Enlightenment;
fascism continued the latter's belief in regeneration and renewal. The difference was that this
regeneration would be based on irrational principles. Fascism argued for values of youth, power,
and masculinity. 391 It sought a new form of nationalist revolution. 392 It followed the basic ideas
of positivism, in its quest for a modern social order, while rejecting its rationalist basis entirely.
Le Bon is important to understanding the development of these ideas, and the transition between
seemingly antithetical systems of thought. Liberal thought formed the basis for positivism, which
transformed into conservatism, and finally a radical, revolutionary right. One idea consistently
reappeared: to create a new society, one had to create a new man. Le Bon's man was an entirely
new ideal, suited to a nationalist era; not the caring, domestic man of Comte's ideal, but a
solitary, individualistic man who struggles to maintain his place in an ever-changing world.
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CHAPTER THREE
RECONCILING THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COLLECTIVE: ÉMILE
DURKHEIM AND THE CREATION OF REPUBLICAN POSITIVISM

By the late nineteenth century, positivism had reached the peak of authoritarianism;
where it was once a synthesis of liberal and conservative impulses, it had developed into a rightwing philosophy based on Social Darwinist struggle. Because of its fluid and multiform tenets,
however, positivism, could not be contained in a single category of ideology. Beginning in the
1880s, sociologist Émile Durkheim adopted Comte's science, but balanced its scientism with
Kantian individualism in order to forge a moral science for the Republic. 393 Durkheim's goal was
to revive France after the crisis of the Franco-Prussian War. This meant understanding the crisis,
in its social forms, and taking action to resolve it. As a republican and supporter of the
revolutionary tradition, he could not accept the conservative theories of Le Bon and others. As a
result, Durkheim's project meant moralizing positivism in a way that would reconcile republican
values and scientific study, the individual and the collective, and social stability and progress.
His work had a major impact on several fields, including academic sociology, cultural
ethnology, and secular education. 394 But this chapter argues that there were continuities between
earlier positivists and Durkheim. It draws upon several areas of historiography, including work
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that discusses the existence of race, class, and gender in Durkheim’s theories and work that
discusses the coexistence of racial and gender inequality in French universalism. 395 This chapter,
by analyzing a key theorist of the Third Republic who stood at the turning point of the
development of social science, seeks to analyze the process of intellectual change in greater
detail. It argues that Durkheim, though he sought to reform positivism, in fact continued many of
its standard ideas, including universal development, gender and racial hierarchy, and a focus on
order. As Jennifer Lehmann has argued, Durkheim seemed to have two theories, one
individualist, and the other incorporating difference and inequality. She identifies this
contradiction with the underlying problem of liberalism. 396 This chapter places him in a different
context, not only in liberal thought, but the changing nature of positivism. It will analyze the
contradictions in his work in three periods of his work: his early studies of modern
individualism, his work on suicide, and his later work on primitive society.
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Durkheim's Theory of Individualism

Like previous positivists, Durkheim sought to moralize society through the individual.
After experiencing the crisis of the Franco-Prussian War firsthand, when the German army
occupied his home town of Épinal, he adopted the mission of reviving modern France. 397 Where
Comte sought to ensure stability through technocratic government, and Le Bon sought to control
the masses through psychology, Durkheim rejected scientism in favor of a liberal morality. There
were two primary influences on this; first, the ideas of his teacher, Charles Renouvier, who
advocated subjectivism and a social individualism, and second, the socialist movement, with its
focus on social organization. 398 Durkheim combined these ideas, positivism, socialism, and
individualism, to create a new theory of socialization in which social progress, rather than
threatening the individual person, in fact created his existence. In his first major work, 1893's De
la Division du travail sociale, Durkheim argued that early civilization had been simple and
homogeneous. The single person was essentially a member of the collective, lacking
individuality. They came together in a primitive, “mechanical” solidarity, in which similarity
created cohesion. 399 Then, population rose, diversification developed, and a new form of societal
structure appeared. Durkheim borrowed the theory from Spencer, in which all phenomena grew
more complex over time, but used it in a dramatically different way. 400 Spencer argued that
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society mirrored the natural state, and a social form of Darwinian selection had to remove the
weak in order for progress to take place. 401 In contrast, Durkheim used another aspect of
evolutionary theory: the growth of biological diversity.
In the late nineteenth century, scientists such as Alfred Espinas and Edmond Perrier
created theories of evolution which emphasized force of solidarity. 402 Durkheim followed the
same line of reasoning and argued that animal life could not remain in a state of struggle. As
species came into conflict over resources, they became more diverse, allowing for closer
coexistence. In the same way, human population growth created the development of social
diversification, which created interdependence and prevented conflict. 403 This resulted in several
features of modernity, including organic solidarity. Durkheim argued that, while in early society
people had been interchangeable, in the modern era they formed more of an integrated system. 404
Individuals no longer made up identical segments, like in a simple phenomenon, but parts of a
complex whole, like the organs in a higher life form. 405 In addition, the development of society
replaced the state of nature with a social realm. In a natural state, individuals were in competition
and natural inequality created hierarchy. In modern society, the theme of struggle diminished and
individuals became more equal. Durkheim wrote that “ultimately, what constitutes liberty is the
subordination of external forces to social forces.” 406 This social realm created the modern
individual. 407 He argued that primitive society was homogeneous, with a collective mind in place
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of individual personality. 408 As the division of labor took place, this primitive state declined and
individuals took greater independent roles. 409 The result was a greater specialization, greater
difference, and a “cult of man.” 410 This individualism strengthened, rather than weakened
solidarity, because it created more specialized bonds in which each person relied on the other. 411
Similarly, solidarity could not threaten the individual, because society created the individual,
rather than the reverse. 412 In his natural state, man was essentially a “savage” 413 or an
“animal.” 414 Society made the difference, adding to his nature, controlling his behavior, and
creating new ways of thought. 415 It formed a collective intellect, involving a larger perspective
and a form of understanding unattainable to the single person. 416 Ultimately, it made him what he
was: an individual with a distinct personality, and, above all, part of humanity. 417 In a way,
Durkheim rejected the hierarchical theories of positivists such as Le Bon. Where Le Bon viewed
the collective as a dehumanizing force, Durkheim viewed it as the source of all progress and
civilization. In other ways, however, Durkheim reiterated the same hierarchical thought. He
viewed humanity as beginning in an animal state, then becoming individualized, and thus human.
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Like his predecessors, Durkheim could not imagine this human state as truly universal, and
instead applied it only to a category of European men.
Durkheim, like Le Bon, viewed history as leading toward the development of male
superiority. He argued that women and men started life in a similar form, with common physical
traits. Using recapitulation theory, he argued that the same was true for early humanity. Over
time, men became more distinct, breaking off from this original androgyny to form modern
gender difference. 418 Men were thus the progressive element in society, creating the modern state
of social diversity. In contrast, he viewed women as not only remaining inferior, but in fact
declining. Evolution caused their mental abilities to diminish. Humanity's original state of
androgyny split in two, and “one would say that the two great functions of the psychic life
became separate, that one of the sexes took the affective functions and the other the intellectual
functions.” 419 There were thus two contradictions within Durkheim’s thought. First, he created an
idea of a universal individual, but identified it with the male person. Second, he based his idea of
individualism on gender complementarity, which saw men and women as representing the two
halves of human nature.
This was, in fact, not a contradiction. Though he held contrary ideas of universality and
hierarchy, these were part of a singular vision of human development, in which the modern
European man was the only true individual and the only true human. He argued that, in primitive
society, people were essentially similar. They had similar physiologies and lifestyles, and lived as
part of the collective. He cited Theodor Waitz's observation that African people were all similar
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by group, with matching physiology. 420 Heredity was dominant in these societies. Because
lifestyles and social divisions were simple and limited, hereditary traits could translate into social
stratification. In modern society, however, this became untenable. Roles became more numerous
and varied, making hereditary traits less important. 421 When this happened, human nature
became more developed; instinct declined, racial characteristics faded, and the person became an
individual. 422 This demonstrates the universalist form of Durkheim’s racial thought. Rather than
identifying Western individualism as the particular creation of a specific context, he viewed the
Western individual as the universal end point of social development. Because Africans this
Western norm, he viewed them as inferior and undeveloped.
Durkheim’s theory rejected physiological ideas of race while recreating them on new,
social terms. He divided humanity into two forms; one, an undeveloped, racial person, and the
other a modern, individualized one. This served to elevate the European man to a state of
superiority as well as to define him in republican terms. As Judith Surkis argues, Durkheim
viewed modernity as the end of tradition and the rise of individual freedom. 423 She writes that
“For Durkheim, the modern individual was a self-made man, a product of his own efforts and
talents and not reducible to his filiation.” 424 Durkheim thus created a vision of renewal which
allowed for the possibility of recreating the person, and thus the society as a whole. At the same
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time, however, his theory posed a problem; with tradition gone, there had to be a new basis for
socialization. He addressed this need in his 1897 study of suicide.

Suicide and the Problem of Modernization

After the Franco-Prussian War, in the shadow of Germany's rising power, French
intellectuals used the concept of degeneration to bring together what they saw as the various
illnesses of modernity—mental illness, alcoholism, crime, and depopulation—into an idea of
general social crisis. 425 German intellectual Max Nordau represents this discourse. He argued
that the increased pace of life, excess stimulation, and repeated revolutions weakened the French
individual's nerves, leading to the increase in mental illness and poor health. 426 The overall sense
of the time, as Nordau stated, was one of aimlessness and decline. 427 Durkheim's theories
allowed him to study this crisis while avoiding the idea of national decline. He argued that each
society had its own normal state, which could not be compared to any other. All standards were
relative. 428 This argument allowed Durkheim to reject both the nineteenth century idea of linear
progress as well as its antithesis, the conservative vision of modernity as a problem. His theory
was more nuanced, but it nevertheless reinforced a vision of modernity as a state of crisis. He

425

Robert A. Nye, “Sociology and Degeneration: The Irony of Progress,” in Degeneration, 60. Nye argues that the
perception of France's weakness compared to Germany influenced the idea of crisis. Robert A. Nye, Crime,
Madness, and Politics: The Medical Concept of National Decline (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984),
138.
426
Max Nordau, Degeneration (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1895), 34-43.
427
Ibid., 1-7.
428
Durkheim, Les Règles, 70-1.

88

wrote that society’s normal state was the standard of health and that “anything which departs
from this state of health is a morbid phenomenon.” 429 This idea meant that change itself could be
harmful, which supported the imperialist idea, from Le Bon, of maintaining differences between
societies. Indeed, Durkheim later rejected the contemporary colonial policy of assimilation and
argued for a form of association. 430 His theory also established that the contemporary rise in
crime and suicide were pathological, part of a “general malaise.” 431 Durkheim adopted an
empirical means for studying the effects of this crisis: the suicide rate. 432 In his 1897 book, Le
Suicide, Durkheim tested various factors that may have contributed to the increase in suicide,
including race, mental illness, and climate, before rejecting all of them. 433
This work represented a transformation in his form of positivism. Where he had
previously used physiology to determine the different states of society, he now dismissed the
individual's role altogether and argued that race was a meaningless concept with no real
definition. 434 Instead, he argued that society itself created social phenomena including the suicide
rate. 435 Using this criteria, he described three types of suicide, egoistic, altruistic, and anomic. In
the first, a loss of solidarity led to rising suicides. He argued that social solidarity was essential to
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human life. 436 It gave a person a reason to live and defined his nature as a “social man.”
Durkheim wrote that “the social man is all there is of the civilized man.” 437 Without solidarity,
this man lost his connection and his purpose, resulting in greater suicide rates. 438 The second,
altruistic suicide, was based on the opposite problem, excessive solidarity, and drove the
individual to commit suicide in the interest of the collective. 439 The third type, anomic, came
from a loss of social norms. As modernization and industry grew, social norms broke down and
the individual lost his sense of place in society. His aspirations grew higher and, as they became
unrealistic, he grew dissatisfied and became more likely to commit suicide. 440
Durkheim was more interested in the two modern forms of suicide, egoistic and anomic.
They represented the current social crisis, which was based on excessive change and instability.
Durkheim argued that modernity and “civilization” were themselves not harmful. Only their
abnormal form, marked by excessive change and the breakdown of standards, caused harm. 441
The answer, then, was to create greater solidarity to counter this trend. Durkheim had two
solutions: first, the creation of professional associations, in order to socialize labor, and second,
stronger marriage, which would incorporate the male subject into society and control his
impulses. 442 Durkheim argued that egoistic suicide was the result of men without social
connection. They lacked meaning, purpose and a sense of belonging. Marriage was the solution.
It was stronger if it was more binding and more developed. That meant, first, that divorce would
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have to be outlawed, and second, that families should have more children. 443 The other form of
suicide, anomic, was more complicated, related to a flaw in masculine nature. Durkheim argued
that the man normally had “unlimited desires.” 444 If left without restraint, he would experience a
“mal de l'infini,” or boundless desire. 445 The solution, again, was marriage; the monogamous
state would regulate his sexual desires and create greater contentment. 446 This system appears
simple; tradition broke down, so it had to be built back up, man was flawed, and so he had to be
controlled. In a way, Durkheim echoed the older theme of women as the solution to modernity, in
which their conservative and traditional qualities would moralize man and recreate him as a
social actor. The difference, however, was that Durkheim viewed marriage as harmful to women.
It had a “disastrous” effect on them, increasing their rate of suicide where it decreased that of
men. 447
Women were outside of Durkheim’s general theory. In his view, the modern crisis was
about the decline of social solidarity and norms, and the consequent loss of society to
individualism. For that reason, it was essentially a male crisis. When social solidarity's hold
diminished, men found themselves without purpose or identity. They lost an essential part of
themselves, that which made them “civilized.” Without solidarity, they were left with only
natural life, “that which contents children and animals.” 448 This was not enough and it led to
increasing unhappiness. It was, however, sufficient for those with less social natures, including
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primitive people, the elderly, and women. 449 Concerning women, Durkheim wrote that “as she
lives outside of the common life than man, the common life penetrates her less; society is less
necessary for her because she is less impregnated with sociability.” 450 In this simpler state, her
needs were correspondingly simpler. He wrote that “with some practices of devotion, with some
animals to care for, the vieille fille [spinster] has her life filled.” 451
Women were safe from anomie because their nature was not infinite, but limited. Men
were more complex, not only more social, but more intellectual. This translated to greater sexual
needs. Durkheim wrote that “love is for us a more mental than organic fact.” 452 For that reason,
the man’s desires expanded without end, unless a woman limited them. Women, in contrast, had
natural limits. He wrote that “in general, the sexual needs of the woman have a less mental
nature, because in general, her mental life is less developed.” 453 Because women were simple
and limited, the regulatory function of marriage had a negative effect on them. 454 Ultimately,
marriage favored men over women because “one needs constraint and the other liberty.” 455
Durkheim had to sacrifice one sex to save another. When he chose men, he presented it with little
comment, as though it were expected. He briefly attempted to resolve the problem by arguing
that women would become more socialized, and thus no longer subject to the harmful effects of
monogamy. This presented a problem, however, because it contradicted his larger theory of
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specialization. To resolve it, he had to theorize a separate, feminine sphere of public society. 456
More importantly, Surkis argues that it revealed a flaw in his logic; he viewed women as natural
and limited to biology, but saw them as naturally part of marriage, which was a social
institution. 457 By making these arguments, Durkheim revealed the basic contradiction in his
domestic ideology: that women had to create society, yet remain separate in it.
Women thus represented a contradiction in his work. He assumed the existence of a
universal person who came about in a social setting, in the public sphere. Women demonstrated
the existence of difference as well as the basic connection between the public and private, and
thus undermined his theory of social development. The solution, for Durkheim, was to erase
them from society and subsume the home within and a timeless category of tradition. In this way,
Durkheim created a more subtle form of patriarchy than his positivist predecessors. Where
Comte and Le Bon argued that men had to control women and keep them in the home, Durkheim
made male power, not only the basis of society, but the basic form of society itself. R.A. Sydie
argues that, in Durkheim's work, “'Society' is, in fact, a code word for the interests and needs of
men as opposed to those of women.” 458 Like Le Bon, however, Durkheim’s theory of superiority
made the modern man a problem. By identifying men with modern society, he made them
subject to the crisis of modernization and thus in need of a stabilizing element. The answer,
again, was marriage. Surkis argues that it served as the basis for men's socialization, reconciling
both stability and individualism. 459 In creating this theory, however, Durkheim confirmed the
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pessimism of the fin-de-siècle. It posited the man, not as fully autonomous, rational, and
perfectible, but as a problem in need of discipline and regulation.

The Dreyfus Affair and the Formation of Secular Morality

Durkheim viewed the ideological conflicts of the Dreyfus Affair, not as signs of chaos
and decline, as Le Bon had, but as forces for reviving French society. Politics aligned with
ideals; the republicans, after turning toward conservatism, again identified with the values of the
republic. 460 As Dominick LaCapra argues, this shaped Durkheim’s subsequent theory of
solidarity. Durkheim viewed the Affair as a religious revival, and came to value “the importance
of communal sentiment, collective ideals, and religious symbols in social life.” 461 He viewed the
Affair as strengthening this form of unity. It revived interest in politics, ending the “moral
stagnation” of recent years. 462 For that reason, Durkheim adopted the mission of creating a
secular ideology to support this faith.
Durkheim viewed militarism as the key obstacle to progress. He argued that the FrancoPrussian War brought it to the center of French life, instituting a religious worship of the army.
War was not entirely harmful; it imparted a moral strength and “violent courage,” but it was
outmoded. In its place, Durkheim advocated an updated, intellectual masculinity, exemplified by
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intellectuals and scientists. 463 This new figure, the intellectual, faced harsh criticism;
conservatives such as Ferdinand Brunetière viewed it as representing modern egoism, as a threat
to social cohesion. 464 In response, Durkheim defined a new idea of the person, as both individual
and social. To value the individual meant, not to value the single person, but the ideal of the
individual, and thus the collective as a whole. It was an all-inclusive, universal individualism, in
which the one stood for the many. 465 He thus rebutted two contrary forms of conservatism; both
Brunetière’s militarism and Le Bon’s elitist concept of individualism. The former argued that the
modern individual threatened the collective, and the latter that the modern masses threatened the
individual. Durkheim rejected both views with a single theory. He argued that the individual and
the collective were never separate, that they grew together, and that reinforcing one in effect
reinforced the other.
Durkheim’s theories became more optimistic in this era. He saw the individual as the
basis for a new social solidarity and believed that altruism and community were on the rise. His
theory required a form of regulation, however, and education was the answer. In 1900, he argued
that universities should establish a new focus on moral education and create a greater sense of
solidarity for the students. 466 In addition, they should open education to the lower classes and
give them more practical knowledge. 467 He gained the opportunity to institute his ideas in 1902,
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when he assumed the chair of pedagogy at the Sorbonne. 468 He argued, in his first course, that
the education system had to create a new, secular morality. Up to that point, morality had been a
primarily religious idea which relied on a divine basis for its laws. He argued, however, that pure
secularization was not the answer. To replace religion, one had to separate it from the
fundamentals of morality. 469
The solution was to create a rationalized form of religion. He argued that society itself
was a religious concept; god was based on the collective, and the soul on the social individual. 470
In this way, he echoed a theme from Comte of updating religion for a secular world. Similarly,
Durkheim saw it as a way to reform society. He argued that secular morality would have several
effects, imposing discipline on the person, teaching him self-control, and creating a sense of
altruism. 471 It was ultimately about control, but not a control that limited humanity. In effect, his
morality would allow humanity to develop into its true form. Because the person was born of the
collective, integrating him into the collective increased his liberty and individuality. Furthermore,
because Durkheim defined the social as humanizing, he viewed socialization as creating, not just
a new man, but also man as a person. 472 He asked, “Is not, for this reason, the civilized person a
person to a greater degree than the primitive, and the adult more than the child?” 473 This quote
demonstrates that Durkheim's idea of universalism was founded on concepts of hierarchy.
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Durkheim viewed education as a form of civilizing. To make that point, he drew an
analogy between children, primitive people, and crowds. They all shared a chaotic, unbalanced
structure, resulting in disorder. Children lacked focus, passing between thought and extreme
emotional states. Primitive people too lived unstructured lives and were prone to anger. Thus, to
educate a child meant to bring him into a modern state, passing through all of human history
along the way. 474 The teacher had to take a chaotic classroom, which resembled the violent
“crowd,” and form it into a coherent group. 475 Ultimately, this form of discipline, rather than
diminishing individuality, created the modern individual. Durkheim wrote that “it is in
submitting to rules and devoting himself to the group that [the individual] truly becomes a
man.” 476 In this way, Durkheim saw the student as becoming altruistic, but he also revised the
meaning of the word. He argued that egoism and altruism were the same, because the self and the
social were the same. One’s identity always existed in a larger setting, defining the other. For that
reason, thinking of oneself meant thinking of the other, and the reverse. 477
Durkheim formed a new idea of the individual and of masculinity. Earlier, Auguste
Comte had defined women as altruistic and men as egoistic. Le Bon viewed the individual as
masculine and the crowd as feminine. Durkheim rejected both ideas. He viewed the modern man,
not as losing himself, and his civilization, in the masses, but as gaining in civilization by
becoming part of it. Durkheim’s superior person was not only naturally altruistic, but naturally
unbounded. 478 The collective “penetrated” him and made him what he was, both a masculine
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person and a human subject. 479 At this point in his career, Durkheim had a theory of how the
person became modern. But he still needed to understand the origins of society, and thus its basic
foundation. For that, he looked to primitive society.

The Universal in the Particular: Durkheim’s Search for Social Unity

Two incompatible ideas underlay the formation of modern anthropological thought; one,
the Enlightenment idea of universal progress, in which all societies formed part of a single
development, 480 and second, the Romantic idea in which all societies had their own, particular
course of development. 481 The former idea influenced Comte’s positivism and well as the
development of British social evolutionism. 482 The latter influenced Le Bon. Durkheim, while
opposed to Le Bon’s irrationalism, in fact followed a similar idea of particularism. He rejected
Comte’s universal theory and argued cultures developed in their own way, with their own,
incompatible norms. 483 He appeared, however, to contradict this stance in practice. In his 1901
article, “De Quelques formes primitives de classification,” he described the formation of modern
thought, with contemporary societies standing for stages in a single process. It began with
Australian, then North American, Chinese, and finally modern European classification. He
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viewed the entire process in the familiar terms of the Enlightenment, as moving toward progress
and rationalization. 484 Was this a contradiction with his particularistic principles? Perhaps, but it
also reflected his larger vision of cultural crisis. Durkheim viewed the modern era as a time of
loss. Religion and belief faded. 485 “The old gods age or die, and others are not yet born.” 486 In
this context, as W. Paul Vogt argues, Durkheim and his followers looked to primitive society as a
solution to modernity. 487 Durkheim, like Spencer, identified primitive people with unity; they
were “perfectly homogeneous” and simple, “as close as possible to the origins of evolution.” 488
Most importantly, they were religious. According to Durkheim, religion was the key to society; it
brought people together, created solidarity, and formed the basis for modern science. 489
This is the key to resolving the apparent conflict in Durkheim’s theory; he viewed
primitive society, not as a stage in universal development, but as a representation of a unifying
structure. In 1912’s Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse, he argued that modern
religion’s complexity obscured its origins. 490 Australian beliefs, because they were “rudimentary
and coarse,” 491 would thus reveal what was common to Western belief, reinventing knowledge of
the spiritual in the same way that “single-celled beings . . . . have transformed our current idea of

484

Durkheim and Mauss, “De Quelques formes primitives de classification: Contribution à l'étude des
répresentations collectives,” L'Année sociologique (1901-2), 4-72.
485
Durkheim, “Le Sentiment religieuse à l'heure actuelle,” Archives de sociologie des religions 27 (January-June
1969), 76-7.
486
Durkheim, Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse: le système totèmique en Australie, 2nd. ed. (Paris:
Librairie Félix Alcan, 1925), 610-11.
487
W. Paul. Vogt, “The Uses of Studying Primitives: A Note on the Durkheimians, 1890-1940,” History and Theory
15, no. 1 (February 1976), 41-12.
488
Durkheim, Vie religieuse, 133-5.
489
Ibid., 593-625.
490
Ibid., 7.
491
Ibid., 11.

99

life.” 492 This comparative methodology had two consequences. First, it revealed Durkheim’s
ambivalence about modernity. He followed Spencer in viewing progress as the development of
heterogeneity, but also valorized principles of primitive unity and belief. He saw modernity as
replacing religion with science, 493 creating a “moral coldness.” 494 Like Le Bon, Durkheim
blurred the lines of the modern and traditional, but where Le Bon viewed both as forms of
irrationality, Durkheim viewed them as sources of unity. He argued that religion founded the idea
of society and represented social phenomena in spiritual language. 495 Though religion was
ending, belief would not. “There is no danger that the heavens will ever definitively depopulate,
because it is we who populate them.” 496 He argued that the working class culture was the
solution, they created a new form of solidarity, with a new collective “warmth” which would
regenerate modern society. 497
Durkheim’s theories repeated the dialectic of the primitive and modern which reappeared
throughout the nineteenth century. Durkheim, like Comte and Le Bon, supported ideas of
progress and modernization, only to turn to an idea of the traditional in in order to anchor
society. It led him, like them, from positivism to a new, subjective form of thought. By the early
twentieth century, diverse forms of thought, from Ernst Mach’s empiricism to William James’s
pragmatism, rejected the positivist idea of objectivity. They viewed scientific knowledge, not as
absolute representations of reality, but as practical, artificial tools for organizing an
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understanding of reality. 498 Durkheim followed this trend, viewing society as the basis for ideas
of reality; “it is the rhythm of social life which is at the base of the category of time; it is the
space occupied by a society which has constituted the concept of space.” 499 Durkheim viewed
Western civilization as rationalizing, but it retained an irrational basis. In this way, Durkheim
separated his idea of society from nature, thus challenging the positivist idea of the unity of
science. I argue, however, that far from undermining positivism’s defense of traditional social
order, Durkheim’s theory simply established it on a social, rather than natural basis.
Durkheim introduced his comparative methodology in 1896, in his article “La prohibition
de l'incest et ses origins.” As the title suggests, he sought to understand why societies banned sex
between family members, and to do so he studied the example of modern totemic religion. He
found that all members of a tribe viewed themselves as related to the totemic animal. 500 The
totem lived in each person, representing a divine power. Bleeding could release that power,
threatening the entire community. 501 For that reason, menstruation presented a real danger.
Women, during menstruation, had to retreat from the rest of the tribe, living in seclusion. 502 They
did this, not because menstrual blood was evil or impure, but because it was powerful; they
imagined that it represented a divine power, and that women themselves were superior in
nature. 503 Men feared coming into contact with women's blood, and the forces of reproduction,
so they set a restriction on all women of the tribe. Because the totem only applied to the tribe,
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and their totem was the only one that had meaning to them, the men had to reproduce with
women of other tribes. 504
In this way, the incest prohibition developed and these societies set up a system of
exogamy. This had two primary consequences for modern society. First, it created the current
idea of moral domesticity. In this form, the family took on a regulatory role, creating
relationships and moral responsibility. It became “the spirit of all collective discipline.” 505 The
home and sexuality subsequently separated. 506 Second, exogamy separated the female and the
male. Durkheim argued that in early societies, exogamy not only set women apart during
menstruation, but also created an entirely different female culture. 507 This separation continued
in modern society, in the creation of separate modes of attire, lifestyle, and habits. 508 In this way,
Durkheim seemed to break with earlier positivists, who based their ideas of society on nature.
Durkheim, in contrast, highlighted the role of social construction and argued that the current
gender norms acquired their meaning based on circumstance. Yet he maintained their necessity
for society. In a series of book reviews on feminism and women's history from the 1900s, he
argued that women would only advance through a domestic role. Feminism was valid, but “the
woman should seek equality in the functions which are part of her nature.” 509 He rejected the
idea that the modern family was harmful for women, instead arguing that it created their status,
giving them their current importance. “The sentiments of respect for [the woman], which have
continued to increase throughout history have origin, in large part, in the religious respect which
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the home inspires.” 510 Progress would only come through the maintenance of tradition, and
women's current roles had to remain the same.
As the preceding demonstrates, Durkheim’s break with Comte’s positivism was not
absolute. He rejected social evolutionism and naturalistic arguments, but maintained many of
their assumptions. He still ranked societies on a continuity of development. He still viewed social
norms as natural, even if he no longer used the idea of nature. In a larger sense, the beginning of
the twentieth century saw similarly ambivalent shifts; not a rejection of positivism, but instead a
gradual transition to new ideas. American anthropologist Franz Boas is representative of this
trend. In his 1911 study, The Mind of Primitive Man, he rejected the dominant theories of the
nineteenth century: racial science and social evolutionism. He argued that cranial studies were
false and that no link had been demonstrated between the mind and the skull, or between race
and one’s level of civilization. Instead, he argued that the social and the racial each had a part to
play and that one could not separate them. The mind did develop, becoming more rational over
time, but it happened through social development. The mind itself, as a physical phenomenon,
remained essentially the same. 511 In addition, he argued that this development was not universal,
as British anthropologists had argued. Instead, each development was based on a particular
setting. 512 Boas thus followed many of the same ideas as Durkheim, rejecting naturalism in favor
of a social idea of difference. Like Durkheim, he also retained some nineteenth century
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assumptions. He still wrote of a primitive and a civilized mind.513 He even repeated Le Bon’s
assertion that Europeans had a greater number of larger skulls. 514
Boas’s ideas were still too radical for Durkheim. Boas viewed the mind as universal, with
modern people following the same psychic impulses. Durkheim agreed that racial inequality was
false and that it was the setting that mattered, but he rejected the idea that “between the mentality
of the primitive and the civilized, there is no essential difference but one of degrees.” 515
Durkheim still viewed people as unequal, even if he used the idea of society instead of nature. 516
This disagreement represents changing ideas of human nature. In the eighteenth century,
intellectuals had seen the person as universal, with the same qualities. In the nineteenth, they
viewed the mind as unequal, changing in nature as civilization progressed. Boas represented a
new idea, which was in fact a return to the early modern theory. It reached a new form in Claude
Levi-Strauss’s 1962 book, The Savage Mind, which argued that all forms of thought, whether
primitive magic or modern science, were based on a similar desire for knowledge. 517 Durkheim’s
own work contributed to this idea of the mind. He viewed all form of thought, from religion to
science, as forms of representation. But he was not ready to accept the idea of equality. He still
thought in the positivist paradigm.
Durkheim’s views of the mind illustrate that the difference between the universal and
particular concepts of humanity was never absolute. Scholars have identified the early twentieth
century as a period in which racial views grew more extreme. The idea of colonial assimilation,
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in which colonized populations could become French, turned to the idea of association, in which
there was indelible inequalities between people. 518 Durkheim played a part in this development.
In his 1902 article on colonial policy, he rejected the false ideals of the civilizing mission, which
he compared to a form of “religious proselytism” 519 It sought to spread French culture abroad,
but this was impossible. He argued that each society had its own course of development, and
“one cannot interrupt a race’s evolution without causing a profound trouble.” 520 Instead, the
French should adopt a more rational approach, exporting science and knowledge, the qualities
which “impose European superiority and which legitimate our actions.” 521 This was part of the
development of association theory in French colonialism, which saw cultural difference as fixed
and unchangeable. 522
Yet Durkheim was unwilling to follow it to its end. In 1910, anthropologist Lucien LevyBruhl used Durkheim’s social methodology to create a theory of mental difference between
peoples. He rejected Comte’s vision of progress, which posited a universal development, as well
as the racial idea, which viewed individual nature as determining intelligence. Instead, following
Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl argued that the collective mind had to be understood as a separate
existence. It was the collective, and not the single person, which formed a peoples’ mentality.
Thus, because the social developed and changed over time, the mind had to as well. 523 The result
was that there were two fundamentally different ways of thinking; the primitive, irrational, and
518

Adas, Machines, 318-21; Betts, Assimilation and Association, 59-89.
This article was published anonymously. “L'Effort coloniale,” 425-6. Gwendolyn Wright attributes it to
Durkheim. Gwendolyn Wright, The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism (University of Chicago Press,
1991), 74.
520
Durkheim, “L’Effort,” 431.
521
Ibid., 433-4.
522
Betts, Assimilation and Association, 59-68, 253-5.
523
Lucien Levy-Bruhl, Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures (Paris: F. Alcan, 1910), 1-21.
519

105

modern rational minds. 524 Durkheim distanced himself from this view. He argued that, while
thought did progress into different forms, these forms were closely related; religious thought
created concepts which developed into modern science. He continued the positivist idea of
human nature as progressive, and thus unequal, rather than Le Bon's idea of total cultural
incompatibility. 525 The subtlety of his argument reveals the complex nature of the debate on
difference. It was not a matter of race versus social influence, or equality versus hierarchy, but
about the nuances of social theory. Nevertheless, all of these theories set up a hierarchy of
mentalities, contrasting a developed against an undeveloped humanity.
Four decades later, after the end of World War II, a group of prominent scientists worked
together to discredit the ideas of race which had caused the war. In their statement for UNESCO
on “The Race Question,” they cast race as a fallacious belief. They argued that it was prejudice
and irrationality, which could be ended through science and fact. Using their expertise, they
argued that the physical and mental were two separate phenomena, and that culture, rather than
biology, defined human difference. 526 Of course, racism continued beyond the war. The new
right under Jean-Marie Le Pen's Front National adopted Le Bon's form of cultural race, which
saw each society as a distinct, coherent whole which must remain apart. Le Pen argued that
people are equal, but essentially different. He argued that attempting to integrate them would be
harmful. It would threaten the nation as well as the foreign culture. 527 Did this represent a new
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stage in the history of racism? Perhaps, but as this thesis has indicated, the idea of racial,
cultural, and social difference interacted throughout the modern era. Theories of race and a
universal humanity grew from the Enlightenment, coming together to form positivism's idea of
human development. By the mid-nineteenth century, this idea split into two; one, a largely
cultural anthropology, and the other a physical form which focused on racial inequality. Late
nineteenth century scientists rejected physical studies, creating a social concept of difference,
while a form of cultural racism formed. At the end of the Belle Époque, Durkheim's work
represented the culmination of these ideas. It was a theory based on the social and cultural, but
recreated racial difference and sexual difference in a subtle, social form. These developments
support Sue Peabody and Tyler Stovall's argument that French racism was based on a hierarchy
of identity, and that “French assessments of the foreign are gauged according to a universal of
perfection that is Frenchness.” 528 The key point in all of the positivists' work was defining
belonging, identity, and solidarity; not drawing simple lines between races. It also supports
Michael Adas's argument that race should be seen as only one way in which the West has viewed
other societies. 529
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CONCLUSION
“FORGING A NEW FRANCE”: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE
END OF POSITIVISM

By the end of the Belle Époque, Gustave Le Bon appears to have fully renounced any
traces of belief in the Enlightenment and its positivist legacy. He argued that the modern belief in
science, rationality, and the intellect was false. Science was a “false god.” 530 It “creates more
mysteries than it resolves.” 531 He argued that it was the “creators of belief [who] drive
history.” 532 “Nothing resists a strong and continued will; neither nature, nor men, nor even
fatalism itself.” 533 Despite his strident anti-rationalism, he continued his positivist belief in
creating an intellectual synthesis to stabilize modern society. He argued that “reason,” while
limited, played a role in “creat[ing] progress.” 534 Belief was necessary, but as his earlier career
demonstrated, he viewed society as losing its religious unity. How would France attain a new
cohesion? Not through social reform or political change. He believed that “the only durable
revolutions are those of thought.” 535 With this, he reiterated a central problem of the modern
world; to create a new society, one had to create a new man. As usual, Le Bon’s solution was
war. With the advent of World War I, Le Bon found the source of the true revolution, replacing
the false revolution of 1789.
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The “Battle of Wills”: Civilization vs. Barbarity in the Great War

Le Bon’s ideas represented an entire stream of thought at the beginning of the twentieth
century. Numerous intellectuals and artists, from the left and the right, in France and throughout
Europe, rejected their bourgeois culture’s scientism, individualism, and capitalism, in favor of
irrationalism and intuitive thought. 536 They saw the old society, based on community and unity,
as fading, and a new, inhuman social order as replacing it. 537 The solution was war. When the
July Crisis came, commentators saw it as a way to break the corrupt order and create a new
one. 538 Their anti-rationalist thought both rejected and continued nineteenth century ideas. It
rejected scientism in favor of subjective thought, 539 but it continued positivism’s ideal of
reconciling change and tradition. This new generation wanted to maintain modern, individualist
society, while recreating forms of solidarity. The answer, Roland Stromberg argues, was the idea
of the nation. 540
The beginning of the war seemed to support their vision of unity. The left and right came
together in the Sacred Union, temporarily healing the rifts of the late nineteenth century. 541
Intellectuals on the left and the right, despite their differing views on education and secularism,
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found common ground in denouncing German culture as innately imperialist and aggressive. 542
As Martha Hanna argues, Le Bon agreed that the Germans were responsible, but argued that it
was irrational psychological forces, rather than philosophy, which influenced German actions. 543
Indeed, Le Bon saw much in the war to support his old theories. It discredited the illusion of
civilization, showing the primitive nature of the Western nations. 544 “The modern world believes
itself free from the influence of mystical forces, but humanity has never been more subject to
them.” 545 This irrationality could be positive. Le Bon argued that it created a people’s strength,
guiding their armies. “Against mystical forces, cannons are powerless.” 546 Yet it was also costly.
He viewed racial hatred as driving the German people into a pointless war. 547 I argue that these
two ideas, of solidarity and destruction, represented two visions of the modern world. He
identified the first with Germany, and the second with France.
Le Bon viewed the Germans as an amoral nation. He argued that they lacked all sense of
civility and liberty and instead followed ideals of power, conquest, and superiority. 548 They
represented the primitive side of human nature. Le Bon argued that in the war the Germans had
reverted to an irrational state, 549 following innate racial aggression. 550 They also represented a
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modern form of dehumanization, in which the all-powerful state suppresses individualism. 551 In
this way, Le Bon identified German mentality with the crisis of modern society, in which
humanity was both savage and civilized at once. He argued that the Germans had created
industrial progress and achieved economic power, but retained their primitive mentality. 552 That
was because, for Le Bon, progress was unequal; a people could advance while remaining
uncivilized. 553 “However intelligent a barbarian becomes, he still retains his barbaric
mentality.” 554 In this way, Le Bon preserved a form of French greatness at a time of crisis. The
Germans may have had material power, but the French had moral power. The latter was more
important, because “war is above all a battle of wills.” 555 The German mentality was weak,
becoming unstable during the war, while other peoples maintained more fixity. 556 The French
attained a greater level of solidarity and strength. 557 The difference was that he viewed the
Germans as an unnatural people, based on an aggregate of races. 558 In contrast, he viewed the
French as French as a true unity, a “historical race” with a long past. 559
Le Bon viewed the war as ending the Belle Époque decadence. 560 It formed a new unity,
integrating the French man into a national whole while instilling values of courage and
morality. 561 It thus recreated the French man into a social being, fulfilling the dream of both the
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Enlightenment and positivism. The war also reconciled equality with stability. Le Bon argued
that the war had formed true equality between people and had discredited the old hierarchies of
class and education. 562 It had discredited gender hierarchy. Women had taken over most of
society, thus earning them a new status. After the war, “it will become difficult to keep them
under supervision.” 563 Le Bon, once a staunch defender of hierarchy, thus used his Social
Darwinist rhetoric to support equality; conflict, rather than creating hierarchy, formed an
egalitarian unity. Was this a contradiction? On the contrary, Le Bon’s rejected revolutionary
ideology because it sought to change nature, creating a new society based on abstract thought.
He nevertheless believed in the possibility of a true, intellectual revolution, and he viewed the
Great War as achieving this ideal. 564
Like Comte, Durkheim viewed 1789 as a false revolution, precursor to the true event
which would reshape the nation and the individual. Le Bon's rhetoric echoed the utopianism of
the past. He heralded the arrival of “new beings which France threatens to create, beings created
by a revitalization of the ancestral souls which sometimes sleep but never die.” The newly
revived French population was “forging a new France.” 565 Yet Le Bon viewed these progressive
forces as problematic. He viewed the war as creating solidarity, but at the expense of the
individual. 566 He argued that the challenge for the new era was to reconcile militarism and the
need for defense with morality and law. 567 Nevertheless, he viewed the war's impact as positive.
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As late as 1917, he maintained the dream that the growing destructive power of modern
weapons, as well as the interdependence of modern nations, would lead people to reject war. 568
Durkheim was similarly optimistic, but his views were more within the mainstream of
French intellectual reactions. In 1915, he wrote the essay Qui a voulu la guerre?, in which he
argued that the Germans bore sole responsibility for the war and that the other nations were
innocent. 569 The following year, he wrote L'Allemagne au-dessus-de tout, a criticism of the
German mentality. He argued that their entire culture was corrupt, based on ideas of domination,
superiority, and authority. 570 They rejected morality and viewed the nation and its power as
absolute ideals. 571 Durkheim remained optimistic. He wrote that the Central Powers would fail.
They would weaken, while the Allies would maintain their strength. 572 Indeed, he argued war
gave him a new confidence in the French population. He argued that where the French had once
appeared weak and demoralized, the war revealed an underlying moral strength and unity. They
came together as a nation and cooperated in the war effort. 573 This seemed to fulfill Durkheim's
prewar hopes for the development of a new, secular belief that would unify and revive the French
people. He predicted in 1916 that “one of the results of this war, without parallel in history, will
be to revive the sense of community (aviver le sens social), to render it more active and make the
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citizens more accustomed to combine their efforts and subordinate their interests to those of
society.” 574 Durkheim thus echoed the wartime fervor, which viewed the war as a means to
create a new, more vital society. Like the Idealists, he viewed the war as positive, but he
continued his positivist belief in the power of secular education. Unlike Le Bon, Durkheim
argued that France's education system had created its current moral strength. To maintain that
progress, he argued for instituting greater “discipline” and respect for authority. 575

The Problem of Human Nature: Le Bon after the War

Durkheim did not live to see the end of the war. His son André died in combat in 1916
and Durkheim subsequently fell into a depression. He died the following year. 576 The form of
optimism which he represented ended. For many intellectuals and commentators, the war
discredited the nineteenth century idea of progress. It demonstrated that science and technology,
rather than creating peace or civilization, led to greater destruction. The war separated the idea
of moral progress. Where earlier thought had viewed advances in knowledge as perfecting
human nature, they came to have the opposite effect: destroying civilization altogether. 577 This
was an innovation in postwar thought; war came to represent the idea of total destruction,
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capable of wiping out the human race. 578 Le Bon was at the forefront of this pessimism. In the
early 1920s, his brief support for ideas of progress ended and he once again viewed French
society as being in a state of dissolution. He argued that the Western societies were losing their
unifying ideals and that a “revolutionary spirit” prevailed. 579 People rejected authority and
sought power. 580 This was part of a longer progression. Over time, people had passed through
several ideals: religion, monarchy, Enlightenment, and finally socialism. This final belief was
untenable; it contradicted the true development of civilization, which was toward greater
inequality. 581 It threatened to block the rebuilding effort. 582 Furthermore, it was growing more
radical; even the socialist leaders were losing control of the movement. 583
For Le Bon, there was one solution: strong authority. He viewed the military as capable
of creating greater discipline. 584 He lauded the fascists in Italy for halting the advance of
socialism. 585 Yet militarism remained problematic. Le Bon argued that progress should lead the
nations of the world to cooperate, but their irrational hatred drove them to combat. 586 The war
did not end in 1918. He argued that the military war was just the first phase in the current
conflict, which would be followed by an “economic” war, and finally a “racial struggle.” 587 He
argued that in the final stage, the races of the East, from China, India, and Japan, would overrun
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the world, resulting in a conflict between East and West which “could only be compared to those
formidable struggles for existence which, during geological ages, brought about the destruction
and transformation of species.” 588 This idiosyncratic vision of the war reflects Le Bon's idea of
the conflict between rationality and irrationality. He viewed human nature itself, with its
tendency toward destruction, as the problem of the modern age. Could moral progress ever
match material progress? For the philosophers of the eighteenth century, and even for Comte, the
answer was yes. Le Bon agreed that for war to end, “science must first of all find a means to
completely transform the nature of man.” 589 In the postwar context, such a dream appeared
absurd.
Did Le Bon retain a belief in the Enlightenment idea of scientific utopia? In the 1930s,
the possibility seemed unlikely. Writers increasingly predicted a new, more destructive war
which threatened to wipe out humanity. 590 Le Bon shared this thought in his final work, 1931's
Bases scientifiques d'une philosophie de l'histoire. He argued that peace was unlikely and that
war would become worse. If the nations of Germany, Italy and Russia formed a union, the
ensuing conflict would spell “the end of Western civilization.” 591 There was hope; he argued that
someone needed to build a weapon so destructive that it would make war unthinkable. 592 More
optimistically, he hoped that humanity would overcome its current failings. He argued that,
although society was divided between scientific rationality and the irrationality of the human
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mind, the latter would become rationalized in the future. 593 Humanity could become totally
moralized, becoming “as different from current humanity as the latter differs from the
rudimentary beings of prehistory.” 594 By this time, advances in physics had discredited the
positivist idea of universal scientific laws. 595 Le Bon himself had rejected positivism's central
ideas. Yet at the end of his life, he retained the nineteenth century belief in the moralizing role of
science.

The Legacy of the Nineteenth Century

This thesis has discussed the development of an idea of modernity, based on science,
rationality, and progress, through the philosophy of positivism. From one perspective, visions of
the modern world appear to have become more pessimistic over time, corresponding to a series
of political crises. Eighteenth-century intellectuals viewed progress as unproblematic.
Rationalization could create a superior society. Later, after the Revolution, Comte viewed
progress as creating unity, but also threatening to unravel that same solidarity. This idea of selfdestructive modernity became prominent in the fin-de-siècle. Finally, the First World War
separated the ideas of science and morality altogether. Science, rather than forming a superior
society, threatened to destroy it. This narrative is correct in broad terms, but it ignored the
593
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underlying tensions that existed throughout. The eighteenth century created not just
Enlightenment, but Romanticism. Throughout the nineteenth century, positivism struggled with
reconciling the two sets of ideals, science and tradition, rationality and morality. The World War
indeed created a new era, but one which took on its meaning because of the positivist ideas of the
previous era. The Belle Èpoque rejection of positivism and rationality shaped the post-war idea
of modernity. I argue that positivists and their opponents must be viewed as part of the same
history. This study has demonstrated that they were sometimes the same individuals.
The debates of the nineteenth century continued to echo well beyond the end of the war.
After Le Bon's death in the nineteenth century, the new extreme right adopted a similar idea of
the nation as an organic, racialized unity; they rejected foreign elements, immigrants, and Jews,
and sought to recreate the French man and halt the decadence of the Third Republic era. 596 They
received their chance after the fall of the government in 1940. In several ways, the Vichy Regime
represented the pinnacle of Le Bon's vision of France; it rejected liberalism and universalism and
adopted ideals of community and nation. 597 It supported a traditional rural vision of France 598
and sought to free the nation of undesirable elements. 599 The reality was more complex; Vichy
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incorporated numerous ideologies, including both traditionalists and modernizers, including
statist concepts which ran counter to Le Bon's form of individualism.600
Nevertheless, Vichy continued the ideals of regeneration the society and the nation. These
ideas were, once again, gendered; Vichy sought to recreate a traditional woman, representing
maternity and domesticity. As Miranda Pollard and Francine Muel-Dreyfus have demonstrated,
Vichy saw gender order as the basis for social order. By returning the sexes to their rightful
places, it would recreate an idealized vision of hierarchy. 601 Most relevant was Vichy's rejection
of intellectualism. Marshall Pétain rejected the Third Republic's “purely bookish pseudoculture” 602 and wanted a Catholic, moral education which would build character. 603 He argued
that “there was a profound illusion at the basis of [the Third Republic's] educational system: it
was to believe that it suffices to instruct minds in order to form hearts and to temper
characters.” 604 The debate on enlightenment continued. Pétain's views were anti-intellectual, but
they echoed the earlier concerns over the relationship between morality and progress.
After the end of the war, gender continued to represent ideas of both tradition and
modernity. Mary Louise Roberts discusses how the figure of the French prostitute in liberated
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France stood for the failure of the nation and its decline from Great Power status. 605 In the
subsequent decades, experts created a new, modern ideal of the home, as a way to recover from
the war. 606 They still viewed women as irrational, 607 but saw women’s role as consumers as vital
to economic development. 608 At the same time, women and domesticity continued to signify
tradition in the midst of change; they were timeless and apolitical. 609 Kristin Ross discusses how
1960s culture used women to symbolize anxieties about the state of the nation. 610 “If the woman
is clean, the family is clean, the nation is clean. If the French woman is dirty, then France is dirty
and backward.” 611 This domestic ideal declined in subsequent years, in the face of social,
cultural, and intellectual change. 612 Yet gender never lost its ability to signify. Camille Robcis
discusses how during the debates over a civil union law in the 1990s, opponents argued for
sexual difference as the basis of socialization. It founded society and created the individual as a
social actor. 613 This demonstrates how one key idea, gender difference as the basis of society, has
continued in a familiar form.
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Another set of ideas, the universalist and particularistic concepts of cultural identity,
remained in conflict. In the 1970s, the new right under Jean-Marie Le Pen's Front Nationale
rejected the old form of biological racism in favor of a cultural idea of cultural difference. This
group echoed Le Bon in arguing that all people were equal, but that they had a fixed cultural
identity and had to remain separate. 614 In contrast, the left adopted an extreme universalism
which ignored difference altogether. Numerous scholars have noted the problems with this latter
idea. By ignoring difference, universalism has failed to recognize real social problems excluded
women, immigrant groups, and those who do not conform to the supposedly abstract identity. 615
Finally, the nineteenth century idea of universal progress remained active. In 2007, President
Nicolas Sarkozy blamed African underdevelopment on the Africans' ahistorical mentality. He
argued that “the African man has not sufficiently entered history.” Because the African failed to
follow European progress, he remained in an anachronistic state. 616 This conclusion argues that
understanding the debates on positivism from the nineteenth century help to illuminate how these
ideas, of universalism, progress, cultural identity, and gender difference, may have influenced
recent history.
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